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ABSTRACT 
A review was made of the current and past use of long-term supply contracts in the 
forestry, coal, and natural gas industries to assess the applicability of long-term supply contracts 
in bioenergy and why they are not prevalent. To assess past use, an extensive literature review 
was undertaken. In determining the current use of long-term supply contracts, professionals 
throughout woody biomass supply chain were interviewed using a structured questionnaire. 
Participants represented forest landowners (non-industrial and industrial), pellet and biofuel 
producers, forestry management consultants, procurement firms, and energy producers 
(Biomass facilities, investor-owned utilities, and electric cooperatives). Participants were asked 
about their experiences with long-term supply contracts, willingness to enter into future long-
term supply contracts, and factors that impact the decision-making process for decided 
whether to sell on the spot market or enter a long-term contract. 
Current use of long-term supply contracts was mixed, with only a few participants 
having willingly entered into a long-term supply contract. Several participants, who currently 
did not utilize long-term supply contracts, believed they had a system that worked and saw no 
need to change what “wasn’t broken.” At the same time, many of these participants were open 
to considering long-term supply contracts in the future.  
Participants indicated several factors that were important to them when considering long-term 
supply contracts. Loss of control was particularly important for nonindustrial private 
timberland owners. Control was also important to other stakeholders in the bioenergy supply 
chain. These stakeholders believed long-term contracts could help them control the market by 
minimizing risk. Other important factors mentioned were the scale of operations to back a 
contract, pricing, use of long-term offtake agreements, building mills in areas with less 
competition, and the higher costs of bioenergy. 
Results from this study suggest the current lack of long-term supply contracts is 
attributable to a combination of relatively easy availability of wood, consumers not willing to 
pay a premium for a less efficient energy source as compared to coal, and stakeholders in the 
bioenergy supply chain being satisfied with their current system to procure/sell fiber. So is the 
current status quo likely to change? The answer is complicated. Due to the inefficiencies of 
woody biomass for energy and the efficiencies of using fossil fuels, bioenergy is not likely to 
gain significant market share without consumers being willing to pay more for energy. In places 
where it has expanded in use, contracts have usually been backed by subsidies. 
In the end, possibly the most important factor is how stakeholders view long-term contracts 
as a strategy. Buyers in this study mentioned them being financial undesirable due to their 
higher costs associated with price premiums. Sellers, on the other hand, said they felt long-
term contracts would limit their ability to receive maximum value for their timber. Is it possible 
for them to be both? Well if the contract includes a rolling average pricing mechanism, it’s 
possible that at times it will be the highest priced/cost timber, and at other times the lowest 
priced/cost timber. It will however, never reach the market peaks or troughs that parties might 
experience in the spot market. Thus, if layered appropriately, it’s possible to keep your 
3 
revenue/expenses relatively flat compared to participating in the spot market. This strategy is 
utilized by many Utilities and allows them to focus on eliminating inefficiencies elsewhere in 
their business while guaranteeing a steady supply/price. Thus, if parties looked at long-term 
contracts as a way to minimize market risk, via lowering market swings, we could see 
an increased future use of long-term contracts in the bioenergy and forestry industries.
Keywords: Forestry, Biomass, Renewable Energy, Long-Term Contracts
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
According to the United Nations, the world reached 7 billion people on October 31, 2011 
(NYT 2011). As the world’s population continues to grow, the demands that are placed on our 
current supply of energy will continue to increase. Further, as the world’s current population 
continues to develop, even more pressure will be placed on our ability to provide electricity to 
everyone. In fact, in the past 15 years, there has been a 75% increase in the demand for 
electricity in Asia alone and this trend does not appear to be decreasing anytime soon (Wårell 
2005). If these massive increases in demand for energy weren’t enough, research indicates that 
we need to decrease fossil fuel use and increase renewable energy sources to mitigate global 
climate change. 
The transition to renewables, and in particular, woody biomass, began in earnest in Europe 
due to favorable government policies (Washington Post 2015). In the United Kingdom, for 
instance, roughly 3-4% of its electricity is coming from wood pellets, largely imported from 
southeastern U.S. (BBC 2016; Pellet.org n.d.; Washington Post 2015). Wood pellet exports 
from the U.S. doubled between 2012 and 2014 due to European demand (Washington Post 
2015). 
The transition has been slower in the United States. From 2000 to 2010, coal’s market-share 
in electricity-generation has decreased from 52% to 45%. However, instead of renewables 
taking its place, natural gas has benefited the most rising from 16% to 24% (ECON 2012). 
During this same time period, renewable energy sources inched higher from 9% to 10% 
(ECON 2012). Predictions on coal’s future market-share range from 39% in 2035, by the 
Energy Information Administration, to 20% in 2030 by Deutsche Bank; depending on the 
regulatory framework (ECON 2012). Additionally, increased concerns with hydraulic 
fracturing will limit the ability of natural gas to pick up the slack (CNN 2012). Thus, as coal’s 
market-share continues to decline, other sources will need to take up the slack and one 
promising renewable energy sources would be woody biomass (Aguilar et al. 2011; DOE 2011; 
Faaij 2008; Flamos et al. 2011; Jiang et al. 2010; Junginger et al. 2014; Kirkland and Nicholls 
2015; Rose et al. 2014; Routa et al. 2011). 
Woody Biomass 
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The U.S. Forest Service defines woody biomass as “the trees and woody plants, including 
limbs, tops, needles, leaves, and other woody parts, grown in a forest, woodland, or rangeland 
environment, that are the by-products of forest management” (USFS 2008). The U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the U.S. Department of Energy use a broader 
definition that includes biomass derived directly from the forest as well as wood waste from 
manufacturing/processing facilities (ex: sawdust residuals from sawmills) and urban waste and 
prefer to refer to woody biomass as “forest or forest-derived biomass” (Perlack et al. 2005). 
Whether or not woody biomass is considered a renewable energy source has been debated 
(Hudiburg et al. 2011). According to the EPA, woody biomass is a renewable energy source 
but it is not necessarily carbon neutral (EPA 2016). To assess the neutrality of woody biomass’ 
carbon footprint, one must assess the “particular conditions under which a type of biomass 
(e.g., feedstock) is grown and consumed” (EPA 2016). There are several challenges in 
determining its neutrality, however. Bracmort (2016) and Sedjo (2013) argue that one must 
consider the type of biomass, how it is managed and procured, transportation methods, 
technology utilized and time frame studied. 
According to Sedjo (2013), the general view is that emissions released from the use of woody 
biomass in energy production would be recaptured by future growth. The Manomet Study 
(2010), however, argued that woody biomass is not carbon-neutral. In coming to this 
conclusion, the authors used a very narrow Life-Cycle Analysis (“LCA”) that does not take 
into account how the market might change as a result of increased demand for woody biomass 
(Sedjo 2013). The Manomet Study only looked at one tract of forest and assumed it would 
regrow over a period of 100 years in determining the carbon-neutrality of the use of woody 
biomass in energy production. Some consider this a flawed approach and that one must 
consider the external effects the use of woody biomass might have. Searchinger (2010), for 
instance, argued that for biofuels to be carbon neutral, it would need to generate “additional 
carbon.” Searchinger (2010) stated that if the use of biofuels did not cause any land use change, 
the feedstock used “would grow regardless of biofuels so they do not directly absorb additional 
carbon.” Thus, unlike the Manomet Study, Searchinger (2010) believed you needed to take 
into account indirect effects of the use of biofuels in order to determine their carbon neutrality. 
Others have even argued that you should exclude “sunk costs” from the LCA. According to 
Investopedia.com (n.d.), a sunk cost “is a cost that has already been incurred and thus cannot 
be recovered…[and]…are independent of any event that may occur in the future.” Thus, one 
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should not consider a sunk cost when making a business decision. Applying this methodology 
to the use of woody biomass energy, one would need to exclude any emissions that would 
have occurred anyways. For instance, thinnings are a normal silvcultural operation in pine 
plantation management. Consequently, any emissions that come from thinnings should not be 
considered in determining carbon neutrality. 
In the end, the majority of research suggests that if woody biomass is harvested in a sustainable 
manner, it is a net carbon sink and thus suitable to being a renewable energy resource (Aguilar 
et al. 2011; Faaij 2008; Flamos et al. 2011; Jiang et al. 2010; Routa et al. 2011).  
However, it is not currently economically feasible (Aguilar et al. 2011; Faaij 2008; Flamos et al. 
2011; Jiang et al. 2010). In the United Kingdom, the government has placed a tax on fossil fuel 
power generation, helping to support the budding wood pellet power industry (Washington 
Post 2015). In the United States incentives have also been put in place by both the federal 
government and state and local governments. These incentives included the federal Section 
1603 grants, which paid 30% of the total capital cost upon completion, and state-level 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) which legislate that a certain ratio of power must come 
from renewable sources (Anderson 2012). However, as Anderson (2012) states, federal grants 
like Section 1603 are set to expire and nothing has been put in their place. How can we make 
woody biomass economically feasible with declining governmental support (Aguilar et al. 2011; 
Anderson 2012; Faaij 2008; Flamos et al. 2011; Jiang et al. 2010)? 
 
Long-Term Supply Contracts 
One potential way to develop the biomass market would be to utilize long-term supply 
contracts, which the industry is currently lacking (Burchfield 2011; Doster 2011; Jiang et al. 
2010; von Hirschhausen and Neumann 2008; Yin and Izlar 2001). Research suggests that long-
term contracts are important when making relationship-specific investments, particularly in an 
immature market. This begs the question, why these contracts are currently lacking as they 
seem well suited for the bioenergy industry. 
Objectives 
The objectives of this research are to: 
i. assess past use of long-term supply contracts in the forestry, coal, and natural 
gas industries 
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ii. determine the opinions of industry professionals on the applicability of long-
term supply contracts in bioenergy 
The first objective was addressed through literature review and structured interviews. The 
second objective was addressed through structured interviews with industry professionals 
throughout the southeastern United States that represent forest landowners (non-industrial 
and industrial), pellet and biofuel producers, forestry management consultants and 
procurement firms, and energy producers (Biomass facilities, investor-owned utilities, and 
electric cooperatives). 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
Introduction 
This review will examine the literature on long-term timber lease contracts, and on long-term 
supply contracts in the natural gas and coal energy sectors. The purpose of this review is to 
compare the types of long-term contracts that were common in the forestry industry with 
those from two energy markets that the emerging woody biomass energy market might be able 
to learn from and to suggest some potentially key components of a long-term supply contract 
or lease. The review will first examine the literature on long-term timber leases, followed by 
the coal and natural gas energy sectors. 
 
Long-Term Timber Supply Contracts 
The first major study on the use of long-term contracts in the forest products industry was by 
Siegel and Guttenberg in 1968. Siegel and Guttenberg (1968) found that there were roughly 6 
million acres of non-industrial private forestland in the southeastern U.S. under contract in 
1967. By 1970, Siegel (1973) found that in the southeastern U.S., the non-industrial private 
forestland (NIPF) under contract had increased to 6.7 million total acres, with an average size 
of 2,725 acres per contract, and consisted primarily of southern pine species. However, by 
1984, Meyer and Klemperer (1984) found that the amount of NIPF land under long-term 
contracts had decreased to 4.7 million acres, a 30% decline. 
Siegel’s 1973 study also found that the pulp and paper industry had the most acreage under 
contract and those firms that specialized in veneer logs and plywood rarely used long-term 
contracts to procure their timber resources. According to Siegel (1973), firms in the Central 
Gulf (Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee) and East Gulf (Georgia and Florida) regions 
procured significantly more timber resources through long-term contracts then did firms in 
the South Atlantic (North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia) and West Gulf region 
(Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas). Using the same regions for their analysis, Meyer 
and Klemperer (1984) found that all four regions used by Siegel (1973) experienced large 
declines in total land area under contract with a high of 38% in the South Atlantic region and 
a low of 13% in the Central Gulf region under contract. 
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Types of Contracts 
In addition to the total and average acreage, location of contracted land, and types of firms 
that utilized them, Siegel also examined the types of contracts used. There were roughly nine 
types of contracts that were commonly used by forest product firms (Table 1). By the aggregate 
number of individual contracts, the most widely used type of contract were those that consisted 
of a lump-sum payment to the landowner, covering both the land and timber for the entire 
term of the contract (Siegel 1973). The lump-sum contract type made up 33.6% of the total 
number of contracts but only 2.3% of the total acreage under contract (Siegel 1973). 
The second most widely used type of contract consisted of pre-determined cutting rights with 
a payment to the landowner on a volume basis as cut with the lessee assuming management 
responsibilities; this type of contract made up 24% of the total number of contracts and 21.5% 
of the contracted acreage (Siegel 1973). 
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Table 1 – Types of Long-Term Timber Contracts and Leases 
Type of 
Agreement 
Total 
Contracts1 
Total 
Contracts 
(%)1 
Total 
Contracted 
Acres1  
Total 
Contracted 
Acres (%)1 
Average 
Contract 
Acreage1 
Future 
Use2 
Lump-Sum 
Payment (Land 
and Timber) 
737 33.6 137,033 2.3 186 24% 
Cutting Rights 
with Payment 
on Volume 
Basis. Lessee 
has 
management 
responsibilities. 
526 24.0 1,281,495 21.5 2,436 35% 
Same as above 
but no 
management 
responsibility. 
31 1.5 1,120,126 18.8 36,133 22% 
Lease of land. 
Lump-sum 
timber 
purchase. 
230 10.5 861,823 14.4 3,747 82% 
Lease of Bare 
Land 71 3.2 190,487 3.2 2,683 N/A 
Lease of Land. 
Timber cutting 
rights with 
volume 
payment. 
71 3.2 1,007,376 16.9 14,188 33% 
Lease of Land 
and Timber. 
No payment on 
harvest. 
Stipulated 
timber volume 
when returned 
to owner. 
274 12.6 520,058 8.7 1,825 
45% 
Same as Above. 
No stipulation 12 .5 19,025 .3 1,585 
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of volume to 
return. 
Share-Crop 
Agreement. 
Timber sold on 
market value 
and revenue 
split with 
owner. 
8 .4 21,433 .3 2,679 35% 
Combinations 
or variations of 
proceeding 
types. 
231 10.5 812,506 13.6 3,517 
24% 
(Includes 
Increment 
Contract) 
Total 2,191 100.0 5,971,362 100.0 2,725 N/A 
1 As determined by Siegel (1973) 
2 As determined by Meyer & Klemperer (1984)    
 
Contracts that consisted of a land lease and lump-sum payment for the timber consisted of 
10.5% of the contracts and 14.4% of the contracted acreage. The only other type of contract 
to gain more than 10% of the total, were those that consisted of lease payments for both the 
land and timber and a pre-determined level of standing timber volume left when returned to 
the owner at contract end; this type of contract had 12.6% of the total and 8.7% of the total 
acreage (Siegel 1973). 
While the aggregate number of contracts per type is one way to look at the most prevalent 
forms, things change significantly when you look at the contracted acres per type (Table 1). 
According to Siegel (1973), the most prevalent type of contract based on contracted acres was 
the payment per volume cut with the lessee assuming management responsibilities, which 
accounted for 21.5% of the total acreage. The second most common type by total acreage was 
the same type of cutting contract but with no management responsibility; this type of contract 
consisted of only 1.5% of the aggregate number of contracts but 18.8% of the contracted 
acreage. The third most common type were those that including a lease of land with cutting 
rights on the timber; this type made up 3.2% of the aggregate number of contracts and 16.9% 
of the total acreage. This was followed by contracts with a lease of land plus a lump-sum 
purchase of timber and consisted of 10.5% of the aggregate and 14.4% of the acreage. No 
other contract type was above 10% of the total acreage (Siegel 1973). 
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 Promising Contracts and Future Use 
 
In looking towards the future, Siegel (1973) found that of the 24 firms that offered landowner 
assistance programs (LAPs) in their survey, 54% of the firms were seeking to increase the 
participation of landowners. The other 46% felt that the returns were not worth the time 
involved. In regard to seeking more long-term contracts, 52% of firms said they would like 
more long-term contracts. Further, roughly 66% of these firms would like to have a 50% or 
more of their timber resources coming from leased land (Siegel 1973). Of the 54 firms 
surveyed, Siegel (1973) found that 57% would prefer outright ownership, 22% favored 
contracts, 2% preferred LAPs, and the remaining 19% favored some combination of the 
above. 
In contrast to the results in Siegel (1973), Meyer and Klemperer (1984) found that 88% of 
firms with landowner assistant programs wanted more of them and only 34% of firms with 
long-term contracts were eager to sign more. Additionally, Meyer and Klemperer (1984) found 
that slightly over half of the firms surveyed believed that NIPF landowners were now less 
willing to sign long-term contracts than they were a decade or two ago. Whether timber 
product firms preferred more long-term contracts, LAPs, or outright ownership is a mixed 
message. Meyer and Klemperer (1984) looked at this question concerning those who wanted 
more long-term contracts and what types were considered most promising for the future. 
According to Meyer and Klemperer (1984), 82% of firms thought the most promising type of 
contract would be annual payments on leased land with a lump-sum payment at the beginning 
for the purchase of the timber. This type of contract made up 10.5% of total contracts and 
14.4% of contracted acreage in Siegel’s 1973 study. The second most promising type of 
contract, according to Meyer and Klemperer (1984), was a lease of both land and timber with 
an annual payment but no payment for timber at harvest time. Siegel (1973) has two separate 
categories this might fall into but if combined, this type of contract made up 13.1% of total 
contracts and 9% of total acreage in the study by Siegel and Guttenberg (1968). 
No clear contract type comes in as the third most promising as three separate types all received 
between 33-35% (Meyer and Klemperer 1984). The second most prevalent type of contract 
and first most prevalent by acreage (Cutting Rights with Volume Payment) in the 1973 Siegel 
study, was tied for 3rd most promising contract type for the future in the Meyer and Klemperer 
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(1984) study. The contract type it tied for, a share-crop contract, made up 0.4% of total 
contracts in the 1973 Siegel study. One point of interest in the 1984 Meyer and Klemperer 
study was that the increment contract was considered most promising by 22% of firms but did 
not show up in the 1973 study by Siegel. This form of contract was studied by Greene (1979) 
and Zinn and Miller (1984). 
 
Increment and Recurring Option Contracts 
 
In his 1979 article, Greene argued that due to resource scarcity, forest product firms were 
turning to long-term contracts as a way to ensure adequate resources without encumberancing 
large amounts of capital in land purchases. Further, Greene (1979) believed that the increment 
contract would be more beneficial to both the landowners (immediate payments that qualify 
as capital gains) and firms (more flexibility because capital is not tied up) than would other 
forms of long-term contracts. In an increment contract, the timber owner is compensated 
based on the average annual increment, or growth, that the contracted land is capable of 
producing 
 Zinn and Miller (1984) echoed this sentiment in their article. However, according to Zinn and 
Miller (1984), for the increment contract to gain more widespread use outside of southern pine 
forests and be more applicable to the Appalachians, the average contract length would need 
to be shortened, annual growth payments decreased (but compensated for at the end if timber 
grew more than expected), and payments should be based on market prices. Shaffer (1982), 
however, argued that most long-term contracts and landowner assistance programs included 
inequities and operational problems. 
According to Shaffer (1982), the arbitrariness of setting contract payments and the balancing 
act between levels of management services offered and a right of first refusal can lead to 
inequities. Additionally, Shaffer argues that conflicts of interest arise with industry foresters 
charged with preparing management plans for landowners while at the same time attempting 
to procure the timber. Lastly, Shaffer (1982) points out that a landowner can agree to have all 
of the management services provided by the industry firm with little to no intention of selling 
their timber to that firm. 
To resolve these issues, Shaffer (1982) argues the recurring option contract would be best. 
This contract, however, is best suited when annual harvests are expected and becomes more 
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complicated as harvests become more sporadic. Overall, Shaffer (1982) argues that the single 
biggest benefit for the landowner in using this type of contract is when they foresee problems 
with marketing their timber and right of first refusal contract clauses. 
 
Other Contract Requirements 
Other timber contract requirements that Siegel (1973) examined were minimum contracted 
acreage allowed, length, timber classes allowed, escalation clauses, and less formal assistance 
programs. According to Siegel (1973), 46% of the surveyed firms did not set a minimum for 
the amount of contracted acres, with the other 54% refusing to even consider a tract if it was 
under their minimum. The most commonly cited minimum acreage was between 501-1000 
acres, with 24% of firms requiring more than that. Contract length averaged was over 21 years, 
with roughly 75% of all contracts being that long (Siegel 1973). Others have found similar 
results with a majority of contracts being between 30 and 60 years in length (Cubbage and 
Skinner 1985; Greene 1979; Zinn and Miller 1984). Roughly 25% of firms set a 10 year 
minimum and 20% had a 99 year maximum for their contract lengths (Siegel 1973). Siegel 
(1973) also noted that roughly 28% of firms were not willing to contract for NIPF lands if it 
only had premerchantable timber, with the other 72% willing to consider these lands if certain 
standards were met. 
 
Price Indexes 
As for price escalators, 19 out of the 23 (83%) firms that use them indicated they use the All-
Commodities Wholesale Price Index (Siegel 1973) , later called the Producer Price Index (PPI). 
In their 1984 paper, Meyer and Klemperer found that roughly 81% of contracts that used a 
price escalator utilized the PPI. It would make sense that the All-Commodities Wholesale Price 
Index or Producer Price Index in long-term timber contracts would perform well but Hotvedt 
and Tedder (1977) found that it does not. 
According to Hotvedt and Tedder (1977), the All-Commodities Wholesale Price Index or 
Producer Price Index, underestimates actual market prices and that as contract lengths are 
extended, the disparity grows. In a 1986 paper, Klemperer suggests that to overcome the 
shortcomings of the Producer Price Index, contracting parties should include a provision 
whereby if the real price of timber increases from the beginning to whenever the timber is 
harvested, the landowners should be compensated for the difference. It also appears that firms 
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stick to what they are most familiar with, as only 8.7% (2 of 23) firms using a price escalator 
utilized more than one type in their contracts (Siegel 1973). 
 
Landowner Assistance Programs 
A less formal form of long-term contracts but widely used in the forest products industry are 
called Landowner Assistant Programs (LAP), Management Assistant Programs (MAP), or 
“tree farm family agreements” (Meyer and Klemperer 1984; Siegel 1973). These agreements 
generally took the form of the timber products firm agreeing to provide management advice 
and/or manage the timberland for the landowner and would then have the opportunity to 
purchase said timber at the end of the agreement (Meyer and Klemperer 1984; Siegel 1973). 
While these programs did serve as a sort of public relations program, they were also designed 
to help the timber management firm procure resources in a less formal manner. Consequently, 
a large portion of these agreements contained “right of first refusal” clauses (Meyer and 
Klemperer 1984; Siegel 1973). This clause allowed for the landowner to seek bids on the 
harvest to maximize their return. The firm in that contracted agreement, however, would have 
the ability to match or exceed the highest bid the landowner received (Cleaves and O’Laughlin 
1983). 
The use of “right of first refusal” clauses is somewhat sporadic, however. Cubbage and Skinner 
(1985) found that only 3 of 16 (19%) firms operating in Georgia in 1983 had such clauses in 
their agreements. Cleaves and O’Laughlin (1983), on the other hand, found that 8 out of 11 
(73%) firms operating in Louisiana in 1980 used right of first refusal clauses in their 
agreements. This difference is apparently indicative of the more formal nature of LAPs in 
Louisiana than in Georgia (Cleaves and O’Laughlin 1983; Cubbage and Skinner 1985). Overall, 
according to Meyer and Klemperer (1984) 51% of firms in the South required a right of first 
refusal clause in all of their LAPs. 
 These programs are not without their own issues, however. According to Meyer and 
Klemperer (1984), firms have indicated that some landowners are ignoring their advice on 
management issues, others are withdrawing from the program before harvest, and an overall 
lack of cost-effectiveness because of the above issues and the small tract sizes. Average sizes 
for LAP tracts ranged from 300 acres in Louisiana (Cleaves and O’Laughlin 1983) and 637 
acres in Georgia (Cubbage and Skinner 1985). Not all landowner assistance programs are equal, 
however. 
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Hickman and Gehlhausen (1981) looked at what kind of assistance programs landowners in 
eastern Texas preferred. The most popular type of assistance program were “performance 
bonds.” This type of LAP required the management/harvesting company to post a bond that 
would insure landowners would be compensated for damages to their property from 
management and logging activities (Hickman and Gehlhausen 1981). Hickman and Gelhausen 
(1981) state this was because most of the landowners surveyed were not satisfied with the 
condition the management/logging company left their property in. This concern was echoed 
later by McGill et al. (2008). They found that the most important concern landowners in 
Wetzel County, West Virginia had about entering into long-term contracts was the issue of 
water quality and erosion; this concern was cited by 15.2% of the respondents (McGill et al. 
2008). 
 
Landowner Issues 
Overall, NIPF landowners are reluctant to enter into any kind of long-term contract or 
assistance program; their reasons, of course, are diverse. According to the results by Hickman 
and Gehlhausen (1981), long-term leases and contracts are the least popular form of assistance 
programs. One of the most widely cited reasons for not entering into a long-term contract has 
to deal with losing control over their land (Hickman and Gehlhausen 1981; McGill et al. 2008; 
Meyer and Klemperer 1984; Somberg 1971). Additionally, both Somberg (1971) and McGill 
et al. (2008) found a general lack of knowledge about long-term contracts and leases. This lack 
of knowledge could be compounding the negative beliefs of landowners for both real and 
perceived reasons. These issues, and others, led to numerous court cases and helped lead to 
the decrease in land under long-term leases, contracts, and landowner assistance programs. 
 
Court Cases 
 There are many aspects of law relating to leases, in general, and timber leases and 
contracts specifically, that are important to consider. Below is a brief discussion on various 
legal issues that may be important to consider when writing a long-term supply contract.  
 
What Makes a Timber Lease, a Timber Lease 
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 As Siegal (1973) and Meyer & Klemperer (1984) found, timber leases can take many 
forms. However, there are certain characteristics needed for a lease to be considered legally 
valid. In Newton et al. v. Allen (1965), the plaintiff was seeking relief from a document that stated 
she “[does] lease all of my workable timber for turpentine on all lands owned or controlled by 
me to Jack C. Newton, Jr…” by arguing it was not a valid lease. The Supreme Court of Georgia 
ruled in her favor, finding that it is not enough to simple state “I hereby lease all my timber on 
all my land to X,” you are required to describe the land as to make it identifiable what land the 
leasee controls. 
 In Steward v. St. Regis Paper Co. (1979), Steward contended the Timber Purchase 
Agreement (“TPA”) was not a valid lease as it was not recorded within one year as required by 
Ala.Code § 35-4-6. St. Regis Paper Co (“St. Regis”), the defendant, argued that the TPA was 
not a lease but a license and thus was not required to be recorded. The District Court ruled in 
favor of St. Regis stating that St. Regis was not granted interest in reality, per Holt v. City of 
Montgomery (1924) and Mason v. Carroll (1972), as the agreement did not expressly “give exclusive 
possession of the premises against all the world, including the owner, in which case a lease is 
intended, or whether it merely confers a privilege to occupy under the owner, thereby 
indicating a license.” Further, the District Court argued that the rights that were granted to St. 
Regis were to give the defendant flexibility and not to expressly exclude the plaintiff. 
 As these two cases demonstrate, it is important to understate what constitutes a valid 
lease agreement and one that simply construes a licenses. Newton et al. v. Allen (1965) shows us 
that one cannot simply write that an agreement is a lease to make it a valid lease agreement. It 
is imperative that the agreement specify the land in question for it to be considered a valid 
lease. Additionally, if the agreement does not specifically grant the leaser exclusive rights to 
the land in question, the agreement takes the form of a license. 
 
Force Majeure 
 Force Majeure is a legal doctrine that excuses performance of a contract by one or both 
parties due to an event, that is outside the control of the contracting parties and could not be 
reasonably avoided, which makes performance not possible (Sabino and Abatemarco 2013). 
Force majeure clauses are included in most contracts as insurance to the parties that in the event 
they are unable to perform their contractual duties, they will not be held in breach of contract. 
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What constitutes a force majeure event is important to understand when writing and agreeing to 
a long-term supply contract. 
 Historically, a force majeure event can be described as an “act of God;” or an event that 
the contracting parties could not take due care to avoid and made performance impossible, 
not just difficult. For instance, a landowner contracts with a sawmill to provide timber over a 
given time period. If a tornado destroyed the mill, the mill could declare a force majeure and thus 
absolve itself of any contractual obligations to pay for the contracted timber. A force majeure 
clause, however, can also stipulate any number of circumstances that would constitute a force 
majeure event (Sabino and Abatemarco 2013). Of particular interest to the current study is 
whether changes to environmental regulations or energy policy could constitute a force majeure 
event. This issue played out in a federal court in New York where the issue was whether a 
moratorium on fracking constituted such an event. 
 In Aukema v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, Chesapeake Appalachia, the defendant, 
claimed New York’s moratorium on fracking constituted a common law force majeure and thus 
absolved them of their requirement to drill, and remit resulting royalties, or remit the rental 
payments if they did not drill. Further, Chesapeake argued that the moratorium stopped the 
clock on their long-term lease agreements with landowners. The landowners sued Chesapeake, 
noting the increased value of their land, for a breach of contract in order to enter into a new 
more lucrative contract with other developers (Sabino and Abatemarco 2013). The court found 
that the moratorium did not constitute a force majeure event under common law as the 
defendants should have foresaw this possibility and thus should have included such an event 
in the force majeure clause. 
Chesapeake also sought relief from the frustration of purpose doctrine. Under this doctrine, a party 
to a contract can seek to absolve itself from its obligations if an unforeseeable event occurs 
that would undermine the reasoning for entering into such contract in the first place. However, 
the frustration of purpose doctrine only applies to catastrophic events that are not foreseeable 
(Sabino and Abatemarco 2013) and the court ruled that a new method would likely require 
additional review. Sabino and Abatemarco (2013) argue, consequently, that parties must 
anticipate shifting regulatory environments and, consequently, draft their contracts 
appropriately. 
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Capital Gains vs Ordinary Income 
Another aspect of law important to this discussion is tax law. According to Butler et al. (2012), 
tax policy can affect the forest management decisions of forest owners. Additionally, McGill 
et al. (2008) found that maximizing income from timber was the second most important factor 
in selling their timber. One way to maximize your income from timber is to ensure that it 
receives capital gains treatment, as opposed to ordinary income that is taxed at a higher rate. 
However, the United States Internal Revenue Code (IRC) has stipulations that must be met 
for timber income to receive preferential tax treatment. In general, the IRC has two ways for 
timber related income to qualify for capital gains treatment. 
The first way for timber related income can be treated as capital gains is based on the fair 
market value of standing timber at the time the contract came into force (Revenue Ruling 62-
81, 1962). To qualify for capital gains treatment this way, the sale must meet the requirements 
of a capital asset sale as outlined in Revenue Rulings 62-81 and 62-82 and the requirements in 
sections 1221 or 1231 of the 1954 IRC (Dyal v. United States, 1965). Section 1221 stipulates 
that for timber to be treated as a capital asset, it cannot be held “primarily for sale to customers 
in the ordinary course of trade or business” (Ah Pah Redwood v. Commissioner, 1959; 
Superior Pine Products Co. v. United States, 1973). Section 1231 of the 1954 IRC stipulates 
that the capital asset has to be held for a minimum of six months (now one year). 
The second way for timber related income to be treated as capital gains is based on whether 
an economic interest was maintained at disposal of the timber under Section 631(b) of the 
1954 IRC. As with Revenue Ruling 62-81, sections 1221 and 1231 apply to Section 631(b) but 
whether the timber was held “primarily for the sale to customers in the ordinary course of 
trade or business” does not necessarily prevent timber related income from receiving favorable 
tax treatment under 631(b) (Ah Pah Redwood v. Commissioner, 1957). To qualify for capital 
gains tax treatment under 631(b), the income received from timber “must be conditioned upon 
severance of the timber” (Lawton v. Commissioner, 1959) and for a period of six months 
before disposal (now one year). Additionally, the purchaser must have the right and obligation 
to cut the agreed upon amount of timber. Thus, if the owner of the timber maintains the right 
to cancel the agreement at any time, the purchaser does not have the right and obligation to 
cut and thus the agreement is no longer a disposal under 631(b) but an option to sell and thus 
would not qualify for capital gains treatment (Gaskin v. United States, 1967). 
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There are numerous court cases involving the tax treatment of income derived from long-term 
fiber supply contracts and leases. In a majority of these legal disputes, the timber owner seeks 
capital gains treatment under both sections 631(b) and 1221 and 1231 of the 1954 IRC. One 
of the earliest cases to address the issue of tax treatment on timber income was Ah Pah 
Redwood v. Commissioner (1959). 
At issue in this case, was whether the oral agreement between Ah Pah and Coast Redwood 
Company constituted an obligatory contract to dispose of timber within six months of 
ownership and thus whether this agreement was eligible for capital gains tax treatment under 
631(b) or sections 1221 or 1231 of the 1954 IRC. It was ruled that the oral agreement did not 
require Coast Redwood to make cut any timber and thus, no disposal of timber occurred until 
that which time the timber was cut (Ah Pah Redwood v. Commissioner, 1959). However, in 
ruling in favor of Ah Pah, the Court determined that Ah Pah did not retain an economic 
interest in the timber at the time of disposal and thus did not qualify for capital gains treatment 
under 631(b) but did qualify under sections 1221 and 1231 as the timber was not held 
“primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its business.” 
In Lawton v. Commissioner (1959), the petitioner (Lawton) argued that the income received from 
their long-term supply lease with Union Bag was capital gains under sections 631(b), 1221, and 
1231 of the 1954 IRC. However, it was ruled that the petitioner did not qualify under 631(b) 
because he received payment regardless of whether any timber was cut and thus did not retain 
an economic interest. It was also ruled that the petitioner did not qualify under sections 1221 
or 1231 as they could not prove that a sale of timber took place during the tax years in question, 
except for the sales already receiving capital gains treatment (Lawton v. Commissioner, 1959). 
In Lawton v. Commissioner (1959), the issue of tax treatment for timber income was from a 
landowner perspective. However, in Union Bag-Camp Paper Corp v. United States (1963), the issue 
of tax treatment for timber related income and expenses was from the perspective of a paper 
company that was procuring its timber. At issue in Union Bag-Camp Paper Corp v. United States 
(1963), was whether various expenses associated with the leases could be deducted as “ordinary 
and necessary business expenses” and whether Union Bag qualified for capital gains treatment 
under section 631(b) for the timber it sold to outside parties. To the first issue, the government 
contended that the agreement between Union Bag and the landowner were not, in fact, leases 
but a contract for the right to cut timber and thus not deductible as “ordinary and necessary 
business expenses.” The Court of Claims ruled that the agreements between the parties were 
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leases as the details of the long-term supply contract demonstrated all the characteristics of 
what the court traditional considers a lease. Consequently, the expenses were eligible to be 
deducted as “ordinary and necessary business expenses.” Additionally, the Court of Claims 
ruled that if landowner did not retain an economic interest in the timber, it follows that the 
other contracting party, Union Bag, must be the owner and thus maintains an economic 
interest to qualify for capital gains treatment under section 631(b). 
As in Lawton, Dyal v. United States (1965) examined the tax treatment by landowners of income 
derived from the long-term fiber supply contracts with Union Bag that were at issue in Union 
Bag-Camp Paper Corp v. United States (1963). In Dyal, the petitioner treated the annual leases 
payments as capital gains under sections 631(b), 1221, and 1231. The Commissioner argued 
that 631(b) did not apply as Dyal failed to retain an economic interest in the timber upon 
severance and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit. However, the 5th Circuit 
also ruled that the District Court ruled in error by stating that Revenue Rulings 62-81 and 62-
82 do not apply. According to the 5th Circuit, the difference between the present case and those 
rulings was the stipulation that Union Bag must wait 7 years before it can cut any timber and 
that fact alone does not disqualify Dyal from treating the income as capital gains under 62-81 
and 62-82 (Dyal v. United States, 1965). 
In Crosby v. United States (1969), the petitioners were denied capital gains treatment under both 
sections 631(b) and 1221 because payment from St. Regis was not conditioned on the 
severance of timber and it was found that the petitions purchased the land for the sole purpose 
of selling timber to St. Regis. Petitioners attempted to argue that section 1.631-2(d)(1) allowed 
for advance payment but this line of argument was rejected as there was no guarantee timber 
would ever be cut (Crosby v. United States, 1969). 
In Godbold v. Commissioner (1984), the long-term fiber supply contract was similar to those in 
Crosby v. United States (1969) and Plant v. United States (1982). However, unlike in those cases the 
petitioners in Godbold included a “liquidated damages clause” in an attempt to demonstrate 
they retained an economic interest in the timber in spite of payment not being conditioned on 
severance. In its ruling, the Tax Court ruled that the contract before them was virtually identical 
to those of Crosby and Plant. The Tax Court also ruled that the “liquidated damages clause” 
was “words of art” and did not change the fact they could receive payment for timber that 
might never actually be cut (Goldbold v. Commissioner, 1984). 
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Long-Term Supply Contracts in the Coal Industry 
One of the earliest scholarly articles to examine the use of long-term supply contracts in the 
coal industry was by Paul Joskow. In his 1985 article, Joskow utilized a transactions cost 
framework to determine why “mine-mouth” coal plants choose to integrate vertically or utilize 
long-term supply contracts. “Mine-mouth” coal plants are those located directly next to a coal 
mine and are thus more dependent on one supplier than might another coal plant is. According 
to Joskow, “mine-mouth” coal plants use long-term supply agreements for two reasons (1985). 
First, government regulations limit the amount of vertical integration allowed. Second, due to 
the large importance of relationship-specific investments, both parties are highly dependent 
on each other. Thus, a long-term supply agreement provides the necessary protection against 
opportunistic behavior (Joskow 1985). In 1987, Joskow expanded his research and determined 
that the same results applied. 
One year later, Joskow examined the structures of “price-adjustment provisions” within long-
term supply contracts (1988). These “price-adjustment provisions” are considered highly 
important in the long-term supply contract literature because they allow for greater flexibility 
in the long term (Crocker and Masten 1988, 1991; Goldberg 1985; Joskow 1985, 1987, 1988, 
1990; Kozhevnikova and Lange 2009; Masten and Crocker 1985; Williamson 1983). In this 
article, Joskow (1988) argued that for a seller to agree to a contract, he must believe that the 
present value of all future income will be greater than or equal to the present value of all future 
costs. According to Joskow, the most common form of price-adjustment came in the form of 
a “base price plus escalation adjustment formula. This form of price-adjustment would set a 
base price at the start of the contract and then let it float based on a basket of indexes (Joskow 
1988). Further, Joskow found that almost all of these contracts included provisions for 
renegotiations if “gross inequity” were to occur (1988). 
In 1990, Joskow examined the performance of these price-adjustment provisions over time. 
According to Joskow (1990), these provisions handled changes in the market relatively well 
with very few contracts ending prematurely. However, Joskow (1990) also found that these 
provisions were not well suited for demand-side shocks, which resulted in downward price 
rigidity. 
These contract provisions are relatively similar to what was found in timber price contracts. 
However, unlike in long-term coal supply contracts, Hotvedt and Tedder (1977) argued that 
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the price adjusters used were inadequate and disparities grew over time. Klemperer (1986) 
suggested compensation similar to what Joskow (1988) found in his study of coal contracts. 
In 2009, Kozhevnikova and Lange used transaction cost theory to study the length of the 
supply contracts in the coal industry (2009). A transition to an industry with more alternatives 
(because of market-based regulations and improved spot markets) led to a decrease in the 
average length of a supply contract. On the other hand, as contracted quantities increased and 
as relationship-specific investments became more important, the length of the supply contracts 
increased (2009). 
Long-Term Supply Contracts in the Natural Gas Industry 
Masten and Crocker (1985) examined the use of “take-or-pay” provisions in long-term supply 
contracts in the natural gas industry. The “take-or-pay” provisions in the contracts should 
increase efficiency because it provides purchasers with incentives to act efficiently. However, 
because of wellhead regulations, nonprice competition increased and led to these provisions 
surpassing their optimal level, thus distorting the market (Masten and Crocker 1985). 
Mulherin (1986) looked at the various theories for why long-term supply contracts in the 
natural gas industry were complex. Mulherin argued that authors like Masten and Crocker 
(1985) were wrong in arguing that regulations distorted the market because the same events 
could be witnessed in markets without the regulation. Mulherin concludes that the best 
framework for studying these contracts was the transaction cost framework used by Joskow 
(1985), among others. Mulherin found similar results to those of Joskow (1985, 1987, 1988, 
1990) and Kozhevnikova and Lange (2009) in that the contracts were designed to deal with 
the unique relationship-specific investments present between each group of parties (1986). 
Crocker and Masten (1988) examined the use of price-adjustment provisions and how they 
affected contract length. They found that the length of a contract is determined by balancing 
the tradeoffs between the pitfalls of being locked into an inflexible contract and the costs of 
negotiating the terms (1988). In spite of the results from Mulherin (1986), Crocker and Masten 
find that even small distortions in the terms of the contract will make the parties less willing 
to enter into long-term agreements and thus shorten the average length. 
Shifting slightly from their work on the effects of wellhead regulation, Crocker and Masten 
examine the various processes that parties use to adjust prices in their contracts (1991). Similar 
to the results of Joskow (1988), Crocker and Masten (1991) find that as uncertainty in the 
future increases, more flexibility is required in the contract. However, if future conditions have 
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a certain level of certainty, they argue that parties are willing to accept more rigid terms to a 
contact. 
Von Hirschhausen and Neumann (2008) examined the international natural gas industry. Von 
Hirschhausen and Neumann find that as international markets become more mature and thus 
competitive, contract length tends to decrease. However, like Joskow (1985, 1987, 1988, 1990), 
Kozhevnikova and Lange (2009), and Mulherin (2009), von Hirschhausen and Neumann 
found that as relationship-specific investment became more important, contracts, on average, 
were extended by three years (2008). 
 
Components of a Long-Term Supply Contract 
A review of the literature seems to suggest there are a few key components of a long-term 
supply contract. While opinions have likely changed, it would make sense to start with the 
most promising types of contracts listed by companies in Meyer and Klemperer’s study. Thus, 
a contract with an annual lease payment for land with a lump-sum payment for timber at the 
beginning or a contract with an annual lease payment for land and timber might be the basis 
for any future contracts (1984). 
Using these two types of contracts as a starting point, there are several pieces that might be 
included to make them more desirable. Given that non-industrial private forestland owners 
are hesitant to sign long-term contracts and leases, due to loss of control and property 
degradation, these contracts could include provisions that would minimize or eliminate these 
concerns. Thus, an important provision to include might be one that provides for 
renegotiations if “gross inequity” occurred, as Joskow (1988) suggested. The contracting 
parties would want to predetermine what would constitute “gross inequity,” but including this 
type of provision would help give landowners peace of mind that they would seek a remedy if 
things went wrong. Additionally, it is important that neither party has the ability to terminate 
the contract without the consent of the other party to avoid complications with tax treatment 
of timber related income and expenses (Gaskin v. United States, 1966). 
Another aspect to include in these contracts would be to limit, whenever possible, contract 
lengths. Contract lengths of between 5 to 10 years would seem the most reasonable and should 
be determined on a case by case basis. By limiting the contract length, landowners might be 
more likely to agree to terms as they would not lose control of their land for the rest of their 
life and potentially, into the life of their heirs (Hickman and Gehlhausen 1981; McGill et al. 
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2008). Additionally, as the research in coal and natural gas contracts found, shorter contracts 
are preferred as uncertainty increases (Crocker and Masten 1991). Another added benefit to 
shorter contracts lengths than previously used in the timber industry is that qualifying for 
capital gains treatment would be less complicated. 
As the legal discussion stated, it is possible to qualify for capital gains tax treatment as either a 
capital asset sale, based on the fair market value of the timber at the time the contract came 
into force (Ah Pah Redwood v. Commissioner, 1959; Camp v. United States, 1974); or, by 
using Section 631(b) and having payment be conditioned upon severance of the timber 
(Lawton v. Commissioner, 1959; Dyal v. United States (1965). Landowners will want to ensure 
they comply with these sections if they wish to receive capital gains treatment on their time 
sales. 
Given that landowners are concerned about the harvest quality and the conditions their land 
is left in after a harvest (Hickman and Gehlhausen 1981; McGill et al. 2008), contracts that 
require a “performance bond” would insure compensation for poor harvest quality and land 
degradation. This type of contract provision was found to be popular among landowners in 
east Texas (Hickman and Gehlhausen 1981). 
If price-escalators are to be used, contracting parties should shy away from the Producer Price 
Index as it has found to underestimate actual market prices by Hotvedt and Tedder (1977). 
Additionally, it’s possible these traditional timber pricing mechanisms do not handle demand-
side shocks well, as Joskow (1990) found to be the case with contracts in the coal industry. Of 
course, most price-escalators have not been used in some time for timber products and it is 
quite possible that they would perform better. Thus, contracting parties should determine 
whether to use one and include a provision to compensate the party that “loses out” at the end 
of the contract as suggested by Klemperer (1986). 
 Lastly, as the Aukema v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, Newton et al. v Allen, and Steward v. 
St. Regis Paper Co., cases demonstrate, it is important to thoroughly think through how your 
contract/lease is written. If the language is vague, you are in danger of it not being consider a 
valid lease agreement. One should also include a robust force majeure clause. Currently, a majority 
of timber harvested for bioenergy purposes is shipped to Europe and a policy change there 
would likely render U.S. pellet operations obsolete. Consequently, any party entering into a 
long-term supply contract should take this factor into consideration. 
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Conclusion 
As the literature in timber, coal, and natural gas industries demonstrate, long-term contracts 
are important tools for parties to use to procure the resources they need to operate (Joskow 
1985, 1987, 1988, 1990; Kozhevnikova and Lange 2009; Meyer and Kremplerer 1984; 
Mulherin 2009; Siegel 1973; von Hirschhausen and Neumann 2008). These results mirror the 
sentiment of Marvin Burchfield in his speech at the Woody Biomass Supply Chains 
Conference in October 2011. From the industry side, it is likely that the lack of long-term 
supply contracts in the woody bioenergy industry has to do with the level of uncertainty 
surrounding its economic sustainability. In the past, non-industrial private forestland owners 
were needed to help fill the resource gaps faced by forest product companies in the southeast 
U.S (Meyer and Klemperer 1984; Siegel 1973). It is likely, then, that they will play a part in the 
development of the woody bioenergy supply chain. Additionally, the large relationship-specific 
investments energy companies need to make (Burchfield 2011; Joskow 1985) will require the 
kind of certainty a long-term contract provides. 
However, as McGill et al. (2008) demonstrated, there is a general lack of knowledge of 
contracts with NIPF landowners and these landowners are generally adverse to these contracts 
anyways (Hickman and Gehlhausen 1981; Meyer and Klemperer 1984; Somberg 1971). As 
parts of the court case overview suggest, this lack of knowledge could lead to landowners 
entering into agreements that do not have the same force of law as they believed because they 
were not a valid legal lease (Newton et al. v. Allen, 1965). In the past, landowner assistance 
programs have proved useful in helping to fill the gaps left in timber product companies 
procurement strategies (Cleaves and O’Laughlin 1983; Cubbage and Skinner 1985; Hickman 
and Gehlhausen 1981; Meyer and Klemperer 1984; Somberg 1971), but may be less useful in 
developing the biomass energy market as woody biomass energy industries will likely utilize 
contracts similar to those in coal and natural gas industries. 
Another possible issue for the bioenergy industry to overcome is that it exists at the 
intersection of an immature market (Faaij 2008) and a mature market in the forest products 
industry. As the research in the coal and natural gas industries found, contract lengths tend to 
decrease as a market matures (Mulherin 1986; Von Hirschhausen and Neumann 2008; 
Kozhevnikova and Lange 2009). At the same time, however, the bioenergy is young and 
immature and thus relationship-specific investments are very important to its development. 
Kozhevnikova and Lange (2009) found this tends to increase the length of contracts in the 
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coal industry and Von Hirschhausen and Neumann (2008) found this can increase the length 
of a contract by 3 years. 
Thus, the bioenergy industry must overcome these challenges as a very young and immature 
as a market. Further, as previously noted, the industry has a potential to play a large role in the 
21st century energy portfolio (Aguilar et al. 2011; DOE 2011; Faaij 2008; Flamos et al. 2011; 
Jiang et al. 2010; Junginger et al. 2014;Kirkland and Nicholls 2015; Rose et al. 2014). While the 
literature in the natural gas and coal industries are helpful in creating a more mature and self-
sustaining market, research will be needed in the bioenergy field to determine the exact reasons 
why long-term supply contracts have yet to be realized. After that is determined, the vast 
amount of research conducting in the natural gas and coal energy sectors can be better utilized 
to create a framework for constructing long-term supply contracts in the bioenergy sector. 
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
This paper used a qualitative research approach to examine how long-term supply contracts 
could be used in the bioenergy markets.  This included the preceding review of the literature 
and components of supply contracts; interviews with prospective participants in the bioenergy 
supply chain; and synthesis of the literature and responses from the interviews.  A survey 
instrument was developed for the various stakeholders in the supply chain; pre-tested with 
colleagues and industry experts; and reviewed and approved by the NC State University IRB 
process.  
 
Introduction 
 Structured interviews were conducted with stakeholders throughout the woody 
biomass supply chain in the southeastern United States. The interviews were conducted by 
phone, except for one in person interview, with the use of a structured questionnaire that 
consisted of open-ended and closed-ended questions. Participants were asked about their 
current and previous experiences with long-term supply contracts, willingness to enter into 
future long-term supply contracts, and factors that impact the decision-making process for 
deciding whether to enter into, maintain, or terminate a long-term contract. In total, 20 
interviews were conducted. Due to the nature of the study, a structured interview based on a 
questionnaire was determined to be the most appropriate research design as they are well suited 
to studying participant opinions on a subject matter (Babbie 2007). 
 There are many advantages to the use of an interviewer in administering a 
questionnaire. Babbie states that questionnaires administered in this manner tend to have 
higher response rates as well as a higher proportion of questions answered in the questionnaire 
(2007). Additionally, the interviewer can clarify any question the interviewee has as well as ask 
additional questions if respondent answers open additional doors of thought (Babbie 2007). 
By conducting the questionnaires over the phone, as opposed to in person, several negative 
biases are eliminated. Additionally, the careful selection of participants and communication 
prior to the interview, eliminated many of the negative biases individuals have in regard to 
phone questionnaires (Babbie 2007). 
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Questionnaire Construction 
 Given the wide range of stakeholders within the woody biomass supply chain, five 
separate questionnaires (Appendix A-F) were developed to focus on specific stakeholder 
groups. The five targeted stakeholder groups are: NIPF landowners, industrial timberland 
owners, intermediate users (pellet and biofuel producers), biomass power facilities, and electric 
utilities (investor-owned and cooperative) (Table 2). The questionnaires were designed to be 
as similar as possible while allowing for differences in stakeholder groups. 
Table 2 – Questionnaires Developed and Components 
Type Sub-Grouping 
Background 
& 
Introduction 
Contract 
Requirement
s 
Types of Long 
Term 
Contracts 
Contract 
Decisions 
Timberland 
Owners 
Non Industrial Private x - x x 
Industrial  x x x x 
Intermediate 
Users 
Biofuel/Biodiesel x x x x 
Pellet x x x x 
End Users 
Biomass Power x x - x 
Utilities x x - x 
Misc. Participants 
Forest Mgmt Company x x x x 
Procurement Firm x x x x 
 
 
Timberland Owners Questionnaire 
 The timberland owners’ questionnaire was based on three questionnaires developed 
by McGill et al. (2008), Myer & Klemperer (1984), and Silva (2013). The goal of the 
questionnaire was to understand how participant landowners’ have sold timber in the past, 
what role  long-term supply contracts, or leases, have played and what factors have impacted 
their decision on whether to use, or not use, a long-term supply contract/lease. The 
questionnaire was divided into four sections. They are: 
1. Introduction and Background – This section of the questionnaire was focused on 
obtaining basic information regarding the timberland the participants’ owned. Both 
questionnaires asked for information regarding the species composition and harvesting 
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practices on the land they owned, or managed. In addition to this information, the 
NIPF landowners’ questionnaire sought to determine the landowners who was 
involved in the sale(s), how they were contacted, what method they used to sell their 
timber, satisfaction level with the work done, and how long they planned to own the 
land. The additional detail in the NIPF questionnaire was included as previous studies 
indicated landowners were not satisfied with the work done on their properties 
(Hickman and Gehlhausen 1981; McGill et al. 2008). 
2. Long-Term Contract and Lease Requirements – The purpose of this section was to 
understand the various requirements participants have for entering into a long-term 
contract or lease. Participants were also asked about what type(s) of price adjuster(s) 
they used and what an ideal long-term contract or lease would look like. The NIPF 
questionnaire did not explicitly include this section but participants were asked if they 
had an ideal long-term contract or lease. The reason it was not included was the general 
lack of knowledge most NIPF landowners have in regard to long-term contracts/leases 
(Somberg 1971; McGill et al. 2008).  
3. Types of Long-Term Contracts and Leases – This section of the questionnaire was 
included to determine if the participants used any forms of long-term contracts and 
leases that were previously studied by Siegel (1973) and Klemperer & Myer (1984) and 
to see which of these contract types participants considered to be the most promising 
in the future. 
4. Reasons for Using/Not Using Long-Term Contracts and Leases - The goal of this 
section was to determine the participants reasoning for using, or not using, long-term 
supply contracts and/or leases. Participants were asked to rank various factors on a 
likert scale, from 1 (Not Important) to 5 (Very Important). While both the NIPF and 
Industrial questionnaires included this section, the factors given differed. The NIPF 
questionnaire more closely followed the one as developed by McGill et al. (2008). 
Whereas the Industrial questionnaire more closely followed Silva (2013). Overall, the 
factors can be grouped into similar overarching groups but the differences were 
included due to (a) previous studies use of them and (b) factors considered important 
in previous studies (i.e. loss of control of property, etc) would only be applicable to 
one of the groups of participants. Lastly, participants were asked to rank the top 3 
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reasons for entering into a long-term contract/lease and deciding whether to maintain 
or terminate one. 
Intermediate Users Questionnaire 
 The intermediate users’ questionnaire aimed to understand the procurement strategies 
of pellet and biofuel/biodiesel producers and the role, if any, long-term supply contracts, or 
leases, had in their strategy. The questionnaire also asked, whether the participants used long-
term contracts to sell their finished product. The questionnaire was divided into four sections. 
The questionnaires did not differ between pellet mills and biofuel/biodiesel plants. They are: 
1. Introduction and Background – This section of the questionnaire was focused on 
getting basic background information, such as: feedstock mix, their reason(s) for their 
feedstock mix, and how they would like their feedstock mix to change in the future, if 
at all. Additionally, participants were asked what feedstocks they thought were most 
promising in the future and why. 
2. Long-Term Contract and Lease Requirements – This section is identical to the section 
in the Industrial questionnaire. Participants were asked about the requirements they 
have for entering into a long-term contract or lease. Participants were also asked about 
what type(s) of price adjusters they used and what an ideal long-term contract or lease 
would look like. 
3. Types of Long-Term Contracts and Leases – This section is identical to the section 
included in the Industrial questionnaire. Participants were asked they used any forms 
of long-term contracts and leases that were previously studied by Siegel (1973) and 
Klemperer & Myer (1984) and to see which of these contract types’ participants 
considered to be the most promising in the future. 
4. Reasons for Using/Not Using Long-Term Contracts and Leases – This section was 
identical to the section included in the Industrial questionnaire. The goal of this section 
was to determine the participants reasoning for using, or not using, long-term supply 
contracts and/or leases. Additionally, this section looked to understand which reasons 
were considered to be the most important when entering into a long-term contract, or 
lease, and when deciding whether to maintain or terminate a long-term contract, or 
lease. 
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End Users Questionnaire 
 The purpose of the End Users questionnaires was to understand the procurement 
strategies of End Users in the biomass supply chain and, specifically, what role, if any long-
term supply contracts have played. Two similar but different questionnaires were developed 
as it was believed that Biomass Power Facilities would have similarities to both intermediate 
users and electric utilities. Neither  questionnaires included the Types of Long-Term Contracts 
and Leases section, as it was determined that they procured fuel from more concentrated 
sources and were thus less likely to enter into any contract that required forest management 
responsibilities. The questionnaire was divided into three sections. They are: 
1. Introduction and Background – The purpose of this section was to ascertain 
background information on the participant’s feedstock(s) and energy sources, as well 
as the reason(s) for their mix. The categories differed between Biomass Power 
Facilities and Utilities. Utilities categories was broader (nuclear, coal, etc) whereas the 
Biomass Power Facility categories focused on types of biomass (harvest residues, 
standing timber, etc). Participants were asked to consider what feedstock(s)/sources 
of energy they thought were most promising in the future and how they would like 
their current mix to change. The differences were driven by the fact that Biomass 
Power Facilities would be focused strictly on biomass fuel types; whereas a Utility 
would have a much broader mix of fuel sources. 
2. Long-Term Contract and Lease Requirements – This section is mostly identical to 
those in the Intermediate Users and Industrial timberland owners’ questionnaires. The 
main difference is that it asks the Participant to describe the types of long-term 
contracts/leases they use instead of including a separate section. They were also asked 
about whether the participant was, or planned to, use a wood dealer, or other 
procurement company, to supply their feedstock. 
3. Reasons for Using/Not Using Long-Term Contracts or Leases – This section was 
identical to the section in the Intermediate Users and Industrial timberland owners’ 
questionnaires. 
 
Miscellaneous Participants Questionnaire 
 The miscellaneous participants did not fit into any of the above categories; 
consequently, they need special consideration in the questions asked in the interview. It was 
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determined that the Forest Management Company resembled the characteristics of an 
Industrial Timberland Owner and would be able to use their questionnaire without 
modifications. The Procurement Firm, however, only resembled various functions of different 
participant groups. Thus, a unique survey was developed using the Industrial Timberland 
Owners and Biomass Power Facilities questionnaires. The questionnaire was divided into three 
sections. They are: 
1. Introduction and Background – As the participant’s main business was not timberland 
management but procurement, this section asked background information on the tons 
the firm procured throughout the region as well as whether they had been contacted 
by bioenergy producers to procure their feedstock. 
2. Long-Term Supply Contracts and Lease Requirements – This section closely 
resembled the same section of the Industrial Timberland Owners questionnaire. The 
participant was asked whether they utilized long-term contracts or leases and any 
requirements they had. Additionally, the questionnaire asked what an ideal contract 
might look like. 
3. Reasons for Using/Not Using Long-Term Contracts and Leases – This section 
matched that of the Biomass Power Facility questionnaire. The questionnaire did not 
include the section on Types of Long-Term Contracts and Leases, as it was determined 
that they were unlikely to utilize any of the types. Consequently, this section did not 
ask why, or why not, the participant utilized, or did not utilize, long-term contracts or 
leases. Otherwise, it was believed that the factors remained the same. 
 
Participant Selection 
 A comprehensive list of possible participants was made. Resources used in 
constructing the possible participant list included: personal knowledge, committee members’ 
knowledge, public databases compiled by BBI International, facility database as maintained by 
the N.C. State Extension Forestry Department, N.C. Tree Farm Program, and a few 
participants were added as recommended by other participants. 
All participants were from the Southeastern United States with a concentration around the 
mid-Atlantic region. Possible participants were initially contacted by email and/or phone with 
interviews scheduled for a later time. A total of 33 participants were contacted and interviews 
were conducted with 20 participants (Table 3). 
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Table 3 - Interviews Conducted by Participants Type 
Participant Type Contacted Number Interviewed 
Utilities 8 4 
Biomass Power Facilities 4 2 
Pellet 3 3 
Biofuel/Biodiesel 2 2 
TIMO/REITs 7 3 
NIPF Landowners1 7 4 
Procurement Firm 1 1 
Forestry Mgmt Company 1 1 
Total 33 20 
   1 All NIPF landowners contacted and interviewed were participants in the American Tree 
Farm Program 
 
 
Interviews 
 Before the scheduled interview, participants were provided a detailed list of topics to 
allow them to gather information they might not have readily available (i.e. acres in planted vs 
natural pine) as well as the informed consent letter for their review. 
Interviews began with reviewing the informed consent letter. After reading over the informed 
consent letter, participants were asked if they agreed to participate in the study. If the 
participant declined to participate in the study, the interview was ended immediately. If the 
participant agreed to participate, they were then asked for permission to record the interview. 
If the participant asked for the interview to not be recorded, answers were noted on the 
questionnaire. If the participant agreed to be recorded, the recording began with the start of 
the interview. 
 Interviews progressed through the questionnaire as they were designed. Questions 
were only skipped when a previous answer rendered them inapplicable. At the end of the 
questionnaire, participants were given a chance to provide any further comments and to ask 
questions about the study. 
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Analysis 
 Due to the limited sample size and nature of the study, basic descriptive statistics and 
qualitative analysis were used. As previously noted, interviews were recorded, with permission 
from participants, and notes were made from the recordings. After reviewing the recordings 
several times and adding detail to the interview notes, they were sent to the participant to 
ensure the notes accurately reflected their facts and opinions. If the participant stated in the 
affirmative that the notes were accurate, the recording was deleted and the notes were stored 
on a secure external hard drive for later analysis. 
 After a majority of the interviews were conducted, the notes from individual interviews 
were examined and examined within their survey group (Table 4).  Table 4 presents the results 
at the aggregate level and states whether the group currently used long-term contracts and 
whether they would consider them in the future.   
 
Table 4 - Participants Possible Interest in Long-Term Contracts 
Type Sub-Grouping Current Use Future Use 
Timberland 
Owners 
Non Industrial 
Private 
No Unlikely 
Industrial  Yes Yes 
Intermediate Users 
Biofuel/Biodiesel No Maybe 
Pellet Yes Yes 
End Users 
Biomass Power No Maybe 
Utilities Yes Yes 
Misc. Participants 
Forest Mgmt 
Company 
Yes Yes 
Procurement Firm No Maybe 
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Chapter 4 – Results 
Introduction 
Participants’ use of long-term supply contracts was mixed. While none of the non-industrial 
private landowners had entered into a long-term supply contract, two of three industrial 
timberland owners were currently in long-term supply contracts. As for intermediate users, 
two out of the three pellet mills used long-term supply contracts to purchase their feedstock 
while neither biofuel producer did. Due to their position in the supply chain, the biofuel 
producer and two pellet mills used long-term supply agreements to sell their product to end 
users. Of the six end users interviewed, neither biomass power facility utilized long-term supply 
contracts but all four utilities used them. However, these long-term supply contracts are used 
to procure fuel sources other than woody biomass. 
Reasons for using, or not using, long-term supply contracts varied by participant type. Control 
was a common theme among participants. While NIPF landowners were mostly concerned 
with losing control over their property, Industrial timberland owners and utilities looked at 
long-term supply contracts as a way to control the market. Pricing was another major concern 
for all parties. While timberland owners wanted to receive the highest value possible, 
sometimes including a premium over market, purchasers regularly cited that premium as an 
impediment to entering into a long-term contract. Few participants cited sustainable 
certifications as important to their decision making. Overall, participants were most concerned 
with their ability to supply/purchase the feedstock, competitive pricing for the feedstock, and 
ease of doing business. 
 
 
NIPF Landowners 
 
 A total of seven non-industrial private landowners were contacted in which four of 
them participating in the study. Respondents varied in land size holdings from 47 acres to over 
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2,000 acres. All participants had timber harvested from their property but only one had been 
contacted about selling timber for bioenergy purposes. Three of the four participants sold their 
timber under sealed bids with lump sum payments and the fourth used a pay as cut contract. 
The participant that used a pay as cut contract indicated they were not fully satisfied with the 
harvesting job done on the property, due to both the merchandizing as well as the rutting from 
the harvesting. All participants indicated they planned to own their property for 20+ years 
(Table 5). 
Table 5 - NIPF Interest in Long-Term Contracts 
 Current Use Future Use Top Reason For 
Top Reason 
Against 
Landowner 1 No Maybe - Loss of Control 
Landowner 2 No Maybe Stable Prices 
Remedies for Poor 
Performance 
Landowner 3 No No - Loss of Control 
Landowner 4 No Maybe - 
Loss of 
Control/Trust 
 
None of the participants were currently in a long-term supply contract and only Landowner 3 
expressed strong apprehension about entering into one. However, this landowner indicated 
that if the business environment required one, they would be open at that point. When entering 
into long-term supply contracts, participants generally were most concerned with receiving 
maximum value for their timber, harvest quality, and provisions for terminating a contract if 
gross inequities occurred, including if harvest quality was extremely poor. Tied into all these 
concerns was the overarching concern by the participants that they did not want to feel like 
they had lost control over their property. These comments seem to mirror those from 
Hickman and Gehlhausen (1981). 
 
Industrial Timberland Owners 
 
 A total of seven industrial timberland owners were contacted in which three 
participated in the study. Respondents varied in land size holdings from, roughly, 100,000 acres 
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to over 300,000 acres in the mid-Atlantic region (North Carolina, South Carolina and Virgina). 
Two of the three participants currently had long-term supply contracts. However, only one of 
three participants had voluntarily entered into one as most long-term supply contracts in the 
industry were part of large acquisitions from old vertically integrated forest product companies. 
The one participant that was not currently under a long-term supply contract indicated that 
they were open to them but had (a) not purchased timberland from old integrated forest 
product companies and (b) did not have the scale of operations in the region to commit to a 
level of volume that would make a meaningful difference. This participant did have multiple 
long-term leases with NIPF landowners (Table 6). 
Table 6 - Industrial Timberland Owner Interest in Long-Term Contracts 
 Current Use Future Use Top Reason For 
Top Reason 
Against 
TIMO 1 Yes Yes 
Investment 
Return/Risk 
Investment 
Return/Risk 
TIMO 2 No Maybe 
Investment 
Return/Risk 
Investment 
Return/Risk 
TIMO 3 Yes Maybe 
Investment 
Return/Risk 
Investment 
Return/Risk 
 
 The long-term supply contracts generally varied in length from 10 to 15 years. 
Participants indicated, however, that some long-term supply contracts in other regions extend 
for upwards of 40 years depending on the acquisition.  
 The long-term supply contracts all contained price adjusters that could be split into 
two main groups. The first group used a four quarter rolling average, using a market index 
(TimberMart South or Forest2Market). The second group used a simple average of wood 
purchased outside the supply agreement. Both types of price adjusters can include provisions 
for freight adjustments but were only included in one pulpwood long-term supply agreement. 
These price adjuster mechanisms are different from those studied in earlier literature, where 
the All-Commodities Wholesale Price Index or Produce Price Index was used to adjust the 
agreed upon timber price for inflation. These new price adjusters avoid any previous issues 
when the real timber price increased faster than inflation while automatically keeping timber 
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prices paid in current dollars. The long-term leases, on the other hand, provided for a lump-
sum payment for the timber at the beginning of the lease and annual rent payments that were 
adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index. 
All the long-term leases/supply contracts contained force majure1 clauses and the long-term 
supply contracts contained Take or Pay clauses. Take or Pay clauses require Party A to supply 
the contracted quantity of a product to Party B who is required to pay for the contracted 
quantity regardless of whether Party B takes the supplied volume. 
The three participants all had similar reasoning for entering into a long-term supply contract 
or lease. The most important factor for all three participants was investment return, as they 
have a fiduciary duty to their clients. The second most important factor can be described as 
technical capacity of their ability to supply a given quantity as well as the ability of the purchaser 
to take the contracted volume. Two participants indicated a premium over market is desired 
while the third participant placed high importance on price stability due to their long-term 
supply contracts with thinnings, a silvicultural practice that would occur regardless. 
As for maintaining or terminating a long-term supply contract, all participants stressed the 
importance of their fiduciary duty to their clients. The second most important factor was 
technical capacity. Participants indicated that it is important to determine what changes, if any, 
occurred in the market and whether they have the capacity to supply the contracted quantity. 
Lastly, participants indicated that their experience with the contracting party(ies) is very 
important. 
Overall, all participants indicated they desired contracts of lengths of roughly 5 to 10 years. All 
of the participants interviewed indicated they desired a price adjuster based off of a local 
market index (TimberMart South or Forest2Market) and, when appropriate, freight 
adjustments to compensate for longer hauling distances. Participants also believed a premium 
should be paid over the market price as the price for securing volume for a given amount of 
years. Take or Pay and Force Majure provisions were also considered to be necessary. Participants 
did not have a minimum, or maximum volume amount to be supplied via a long-term supply 
contract but believed it is beneficial to have at least a small portion of annual volume sold 
under a long-term supply contracts to guarantee market share. 
1 Force majure is a legal doctrine that alleviates a party from performing a contractual duty due to an unforeseeable 
and controllable event. 
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Two of the three participants indicated that they utilized long-term leases. These leases ranged 
in length from 25 years to 100 years. Both participants indicated that the leases contained an 
upfront payment for timber and an annual rent payment to the landowner. This type of long-
term lease was the 5th most prevalent in number of contracts found by Siegel (1973) and was 
considered the most promising for future long-term lease types by Meyer & Klemperer (1984). 
Both participants were neutral on whether they desired more long-term leases in the future. 
They indicated the main benefit a long-term lease provides is that they require lower upfront 
capital than a fee-based acquisition. However, these benefits are mitigated by the value 
fluctuation possible in a long-term lease as their value is highly correlated to the price of timber. 
  
Intermediate Users 
 
Biofuel/Diesel Plants 
 
 One biodiesel and one biofuel plant were contacted and interviewed for the study. The 
facilities are capable of producing 1 million to 12 million gallons per year. The biofuel plant 
only use clean de-barked chips that met specific standards; whereas the biodiesel plant mostly 
uses poultry and swine fat and occasionally used cooking oil and low quality soybean oil. While 
the biofuel plant cited eliminating as many variables to focus on the production process, the 
biodiesel facility indicated that their feedstock choice was strictly driven by price. Both facilities 
desired their feedstock to change in the future. The biofuel plant wished to switch to whole-
tree chips produced in the woods and the biodiesel plant wanted to use locally grown oil seed 
crops. The biodiesel plant cited the high cost of locally grown oil seed crops compared to the 
prices end users were willing to pay for their product as the major obstacle to their use (Table 
7). 
Table 7 - Biofuel/Biodiesel Plant Interest in Long-Term Contracts 
 Current Use Future Use Top Reason For 
Top Reason 
Against 
Biodiesel No Maybe N/A Maturity of Market 
Biofuel No Maybe N/A Equitable 
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Neither facility currently used long-term supply contracts but both were open to them in the 
future. The biodiesel plant indicated that they did not currently utilize long-term supply 
contracts for several reasons. First, the facility cited the immaturity of the market and lack of 
stable demand. Second, the facility cited the price competition from regular diesel as end users 
are, generally, not willing to pay a premium for a greener product. Finally, the facility cited the 
uncertainty of federal tax incentives that are renewed every year. Without these incentives, the 
facility indicated they could not operate and would be forced to shut down. 
The biofuel facility, on the other hand, stated that their main reason for not utilizing long-term 
supply contracts was due to (a) the company’s chip standards leading to a supply chain forming 
around them and (b) the utilization of long-term off-take agreements for their products. The 
facility also indicated that while their relationship with their suppliers would likely be long-
term, a long-term contract is not likely to provide any additional benefits over a yearly contract 
that is renewed. Additionally, the facility indicated that they enter into long-term off-take 
contracts before their mills are built. The facility declined to provide additional detail but it is 
possible the use of a long-term off-take contract allows for more flexibility in their 
procurement decisions. This is similar to the strategy employed by Pellet Mill 1.  
The reasons for entering into, maintaining, and/or terminating a long-term supply contract 
differed between facilities. The biodiesel facility indicated that the most important factors were 
the immaturity of the market and the presence of incentives/subsidies. Conversely, the biofuel 
producer was more concerned with the content of the contract when entering into it. 
Specifically, the facility indicated the pricing mechanism and structuring the contract so that 
both parties had a vested interest in the other’s success. The facility specifically mentioned the 
important of a take-or-pay provision, a meaningful force majeure clause, and provisions for non-
compliance that penalized the party enough to sting while not crippling them and allowing for 
a make-up period for short-term issues of nonperformance. 
As to whether to maintain or terminate a long-term supply contract, the biofuel facility was 
mostly concerned with whether the counterparty was reliable and easy to do business with. 
Additionally, the facility would evaluate the performance of the pricing mechanism to ensure 
that it was equitable for all parties.  
Neither facility considered any of the contract types studied by Siegel (1973) and Meyer & 
Klemperer (1984) as promising in the future. For the biodiesel producer, they did not have a 
contract length in mind but desired to have a minimum of 50% of their annual feedstock needs 
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supplied via a long-term contract, while attempting to take advantage of spot market prices to 
lower their overall feedstock cost. The biofuel producer desired contract lengths between 5-
10 years with, roughly, 250,000 tons, per contract, of clean de-barked chips supplied annually 
at a minimum. As mentioned previously, the contract must be structured to ensure both parties 
have a vested interest in each other’s success. To this affect, the facility’s ideal contract would 
have a take-or-pay provision with consequences for non-performance that stung but did not 
cripple the other party. Additionally, the facility indicated it was important that the contract 
include a make-up provision that allowed for the party not in compliance, due to reasons other 
than lack of effort/incompetence, to make the other party whole before any consequences 
levied. Lastly, the facility indicated that stumpage and hauling costs be independent of one 
another. 
 
Pellet Mills 
 
Three pellet facilities in the southeast were contacted for this study. Respondents varied in 
production capacity from, approximately, 50,000 tons annually to over 700,000 tons annually 
of wood pellets produced. Two of the three participants had long-term contracts, with one not 
willing to disclose details. Two of the mills utilized a mix of 80/20 hardwood to pine while 
one of the larger two facilities utilized 100% pine; though, they noted in the future they would 
like to add between 5-10% hardwood to their mix for pellets (Table 8).  
Table 8 - Pellet Mills Interest in Long-Term Contracts 
 Current Use Future Use Top Reason For 
Top Reason 
Against 
Mill 1 Yes Yes Risk Mitigation 
Few Credit Worthy 
Counterparties 
Mill 2 No Maybe Price Stability 
Current Strategy 
Working 
Mill 3 Yes Yes Risk Mitigation 
Concern of Future 
Market Conditions 
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Mill 2 is the smallest of the three producers and indicated that they did not utilize long-term 
supply contracts or leases as their current system of one-year contracts had not been a major 
issue. This producer did, however, contract with a wood dealer to supply their mill. The mill 
indicated that they did not have a particular reason for utilizing one-year contracts with a wood 
dealer. Mill 1, the largest producer interviewed, indicated that the reason they didn’t have more 
long-term fiber supply contracts was that there are few counterparties that can support them 
and the one’s that can, generally attach a significant price premium to them. Thus, making 
them financially undesirable. Additionally, Mill 1 indicated that they seek to build mills in 
shallower markets with less competition for resources. 
Mill 3 indicated they had a total of three long-term supply contracts that supplied the mill with, 
roughly, 14% of their annual fiber needs. Two of the contracts were for five years and the third 
contract was for 10 years. None of the contracts provided for the mill to have management 
responsibilities. Their contracts utilized a local market index price adjuster with a four quarter 
rolling average. 
Both Mill 1 and Mill 3 indicated they utilized long-term off-take contracts to sell their finished 
products for end-use demand. Mill 3 indicated they varied in length between five to seven years 
while Mill 1 declined to provide any detail. Both mills indicated that these contracts were 
essential to their procurement decisions and that they would be less likely to enter into a long-
term fiber procurement contract if these were not in place. 
The reasons for entering into, maintain, and/or terminate a long-term supply contract varied 
by mill. However, fuel source availability was important to all three mills. Pricing was also 
important to all three mills but their reasoning differed. While Mill 2 was mostly concerned 
with price stability, Mills 1 and 3 indicated that it was equally important to them that the pricing 
was competitive and not unreasonably expensive. Mill 2 indicated community relations was 
important to them while Mill 3 indicated the ease of doing business was their third most 
important factor going into their procurement and selling contract decisions. Mills 1 and 3 
indicated the presence and timing of their supply contracts with their long-term supply 
agreements to sell pellets was highly important. Mill 3 was the only mill interviewed that 
indicated sustainable third party certifications were important due to European Union 
subsidies. Future market conditions was mentioned by all three mills as one of their biggest 
apprehension to entering into a long-term contract. 
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The larger mills indicated they desired contract lengths that corresponded with their offtake 
agreements but with one mill signaling five years as a reasonable length. As with TIMO/REIT 
timberland managers, a local market index as a price adjuster was desired. None of the mills 
explicitly stated they desired either a Take or Pay and/or Force Majure provision(s) but all of 
them considered flexibility and risk mitigation as important qualities in a long-term contract to 
purchase fiber or sell pellets. Thus, it can be reasonably assumed that these would be important 
provisions to include in any long-term supply contract. One mill indicated they would prefer 
a long-term supply contract to supply, roughly, 100,000 tons per year, while the other two mills 
did not indicate a preference. 
All three mills were open to entering into future long-term supply contracts. However, Mill 2 
desired to stay with their current procurement system, of one-year contracts, while Mill 1 
indicated that the lack of credit worthy counterparties and price premiums attached to them 
minimized their appetite for them. This mill also indicated that supply chains have tended to 
develop around them due to their reliable demand, making long-term supply contracts 
unnecessary with the current level of local competition. Mill 1 stated that if competition were 
to increase in their fiber baskets, long-term supply contracts might become more prevalent in 
their procurement decisions. Mill 3 was the most open to entering into more long-term supply 
contracts. The mill stated they wished to increase their use of long-term supply contracts from, 
roughly, 14% of their annual volume needs to 20% as they found their long-term contracts to 
reduce market volatility as periods of higher price wood was mitigated by periods of lower cost 
wood. 
 
End Users 
 
Biomass Power Plants 
 
Two biomass power plants were contacted and interviewed for this study. The plants were 
capable of producing 15 and 20 megawatts per hour, with Plant 1 being the larger power 
producer of the two plants. One of the plants also produced 240,000lbs/hr of steam. Neither 
plant currently used long-term supply contracts or leases for their procurement needs with 
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Plant 1 willing to consider shorter contracts of 18-24 months and Plant 2 being open to long-
term supply contracts or leases (Table 9). 
Table 9 - Biomass Power Plants Interest in Long-Term Contracts 
 Current Use Future Use Top Reason For 
Top Reason 
Against 
Plant 1 No No Price Stability 
Price Premiums by 
TIMO/REITs 
Plant 2 No Maybe Price Stability 
High Price of 
Power Generation 
 
Both plants were specifically designed to handle their prospective feedstocks. Plant 1 utilizes 
70% wood fiber (90% in-woods chips, 10% mill residues), 28% tire chips and 2% pallets. Plant 
2, utilizes 80-90% logging residues and 10-20% mill residues in the form of chips and sawdust. 
Both plants were designed/permitted for their feedstocks and did not wish for their feedstock 
mix to change. Plant 1 cited the economics of their feedstock choices and also indicated that 
due to the EPA loosening some rules recently, tire derived and industrial waste were 
considered promising feedstocks in the future due to their higher BTU values as compared to 
green wood. Plant 2 noted that the design specifications for their facility were chosen due to 
the mill’s location in a highly productive logging region that provided abundant residues for 
use. 
Plant 1 indicated their average length of contract was one year and included an additional year 
extension with mutual consent. The contracts stipulate a minimum volume and include an 
option to buy additional volume at the same price. Some of Plant 1 contracts had fuel surcharge 
adjustments but did not include any price adjusters. Plant 2 currently uses “loosely worded 
[contracts]” as they are less sophisticated and the counter parties, generally, do not have the 
ability to back them up if they failed to perform. 
While both plants currently had somewhat similar current contracts, they differed in their ideal 
use. Plant 1, as previously mentioned, desired contracts under two years in length. Plant 2, on 
the other hand, believed a 10-year contract to be most ideal. Both plants desired contracts 
without fuel adjustments and some flexibility in supplied volume. 
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Both plants were similar in the reasons for not currently using long-term supply contracts. 
They mentioned that it was not common in the forestry industry to enter into long-term 
contracts and that most parties, outside of TIMOs/REITs and their charged premiums, do 
not control the necessary supply or can back up the contract financially if they failed to 
perform. Most importantly, both plants indicated a concern for losing money due to the price 
of electricity and the price of fiber. 
Overall, reasons for entering into a long-term supply contract were relatively similar by plant. 
Both plants considered the profitability of the contracts as paramount. Plant 1, however, was 
more concerned about price stability whereas Plant 2 was focused on the interplay between 
the price of electricity and fiber supply. Both plants also considered the ability of counterparties 
to fulfil their contractual requirements as very important. Plant 1 indicated that 
TIMOs/REITs, which generally require a premium over market are the majority of parties 
that can back up a long-term supply contract. As for the third most important reason, Plant 1 
indicated their knowledge of the market was important to them. Whereas, Plant 2 indicated 
the ease of doing business was most important. 
Reasons for maintaining or terminating a long-term contract were similar as well. Plant 1, 
however, specifically indicated changes in environmental law and loss of subsidies as important 
in their decision making process. Plant 2, on the other hand, stated they believed one should 
never enter into a long-term contract due to subsidies as they cannot be guaranteed into the 
future. Lastly, neither plant considered sustainable certifications as important in long-term 
contract decisions. 
Overall, Plant 1 indicated they are only likely to use shorter term contracts for their fuel 
procurement needs. Plant 2 was open to long-term contracts but indicated that either the price 
of electricity would have to rise or the price of fiber would need to decrease for it to become 
financially viable as a procurement method. 
 
Electric Utilities 
 
 Four utilities were interviewed for this study. Of that total, Utility 1 is a university 
power plant, Utility 2 is an electric cooperative, and Utilities 3 & 4 are investor-owned. Two 
of the four participants have either tested biomass power and plan to utilize it in the future 
(Utility 1) or currently operate biomass power facilities (Utility 4). Utility 3 and Utility 2 both 
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indicated that they had no plans to utilize biomass for the foreseeable future due to prohibitive 
costs. Utilities 1, 3, and 4 utilized contracts within the three to five years range. Utility 2 has 
several purchase agreements that extend up to 20+ years. None of the utilities indicated they 
desired changes in their procurement strategies but all of them did indicate that as natural gas 
becomes cheaper, less coal is likely to be utilized in power generation. 
Currently, the investor-owned utilities (Utilities 3 and 4) are going through a drastic change in 
how they generate their power. 10 years ago, coal represented over 50% of their power 
generation. The percentage of coal utilized now is in the mid to high-30s as the use of natural 
gas, nuclear, and renewable energies have increased in power generation. Due to cheap shale 
gas, natural gas has benefited the most as it has gone from single digits to the low and mid-30s 
in their generation mix. Nuclear power generation has remained slightly below 20%, since the 
1970s. However, due to increasing concerns over greenhouse gases, one investor utility 
indicated they would like to double the percentage of power generated from nuclear plants. 
Renewables were all below 10% and of that amount, biomass represented less than 1%.  
Utilities 1 and 2 both had unique generation mixes. Utility 1, due to its size, did not use any 
nuclear power. Its energy mix was split between coal (~70%) and natural gas (30%). In the 
future, the plant believed coal would drop to around 50% of their generation needs with 
biomass picking up a majority of the slack and natural gas remaining around its current levels. 
Utility 2 indicated that roughly 56% of their energy portfolio was generated from nuclear 
power (through purchase agreements), with coal and natural gas representing ~13% and 19% 
of their portfolio. The balance represented a mix of renewables and diesel plants as required 
for peak generation needs.  
While Utilities 2 and 3 indicated that the BTU value of biomass was too low for its use to be 
economical, Utility 4 operated several biomass plants and Utility 1 indicated that they had 
tested its use and desired to make it a part of their energy mix. Utility 1 stated the reason they 
began to test biomass in their boilers was due to the university instituting a climate action plan. 
However, Utility 1 indicated the reason they were not currently using wood pellets on a regular 
basis had to do with storage issues. Utility 1 indicated that they would like to procure terrified 
wood, which can be stored similar to coal, to utilize in their energy mix. Utility 4, indicated 
that the reason they were operating several biomass power plants primarily had to do with 
aging coal plants nearing retirement and retrofitting them to meet new environmental laws was 
not as economical as converting them to biomass power. Additionally, the utility indicated that 
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there were some tax benefits for the conversions and that the plants are located in biomass 
rich markets. The utility stated that they did not plan to increase their use of biomass power 
and would continue to use wood waste products (harvesting, mill residues, etc) instead of 
pellets due to their lower costs  
The procurement strategies utilized by all the interviewed participants in this section were 
similar (Table 10). Three out of the four participants indicated they utilized contracts that 
varied in length of three to five years. The electric cooperative entered into purchase 
agreements that varied in length from five years to 20+ years. Utility 1 indicated that they 
would be interested in possibly entering into a 10 year contract with coal or torrified wood. All 
four participants’ procurement strategies focused on risk mitigation. To that end, the utilities 
stated that they stagger their contracts over time in order to minimize market swings. 
Additionally, all participants indicated that they vary pricing mechanisms and contract with 
multiple parties to minimize market swings as well as supply disruptions. Details on contract 
requirements were only provided by Utility 1. Specifically, the plant indicated that they had a 
set price for the procured fuel and an adjuster only kicked in if (a) the market price was +/- 
10% of the contract price and/or (b) the BTU was +/- 2% of the contract amount. Overall, 
quantities were estimated with the participant able to call additional volume. Lastly, take-or-pay 
provisions were not included in all contracts. 
Table 10 - Electric Utilities Interest in Long-Term Contracts 
 Current Use Future Use Top Reason For 
Top Reason 
Against 
Utility 1 Yes Yes Reliable Supply 
Price & Fuel 
Availability 
Utility 2 Yes Yes Risk Mitigation Lack of Flexibility 
Utility 3 Yes Yes Risk Mitigation Lack of Flexibility 
Utility 4 Yes Yes N/A N/A 
 
Overall, the participants had similar reasons deciding whether to enter into a long-term supply 
contract in their procurement strategy. Price stability was the most important listed. All 
participants wanted to manage market risks and provide their customers with the lowest and 
most stable price possible. The second most important factor was the availability from diverse 
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sources. As other participants in the study stated, if the fuel isn’t available, you can’t contract 
for it. Additionally, all the participants indicated it was important that they be able to source 
their fuel from several sources to minimize possible supply disruptions. The third most 
important factor was having infrastructure in place in order to be able to obtain and move the 
fuel supply to the plant that is needed at. All the participants indicated similar reason for 
deciding whether to maintain or terminate a long-term supply contract. One additional factor 
mentioned was their experience with the provider. As with other participants in the study, 
utilities stated it was important that the counterparty be easy to work with and able to perform 
their contractual duties. 
The participants did not provide specifics for their ideal contract but flexibility and stability 
were mentioned throughout the interviews. The utilities interviewed utilized contracts to 
smooth out market swings as well as protect them from supply disruptions. The participants’ 
considered contracts a means to managing uncertainty in the market place and thus giving 
them the ability to focus on delivery energy to end-users. The participants were split on their 
belief and utilization of biomass power. The two participants that were either using or planned 
to use biomass power, were guided to this decision due to environmental regulations that either 
required its use or made aging coal plants uneconomical. The other two participants stated that 
biomass power was too expensive to be included in their current energy mix. 
 
Miscellaneous Participants 
 
Forestry Management Company 
 
 One forestry management company firm was contacted for this study to ascertain their 
views on long-term supply contracts and leases (Table 11). The firm does not enter into any 
long-term contracts or leases but does manage land subject to them. In general, the firm 
believes long-term supply contracts are better suited for shallower markets with less 
competition and would like to get out of the contracts in deeper markets to take advantage of 
the competition for resources. 
Table 11 - Miscellaneous Participants Interest in Long-Term Contracts 
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 Current Use Future Use Top Reason For 
Top Reason 
Against 
Forest 
Management 
Company 
Yes Maybe Price Stability 
Less Able to 
Benefit From 
Competition 
Procurement 
Firm 
No Maybe Stability of Market Misc. 
 
The firm does not manage any land subject to bioenergy contracts but does manage land in 
the mid-Atlantic region that is subject to traditional fiber-supply contracts. These contracts 
range in length from 10 years to 20 years. The firm has engaged with pellet mills and they have 
generally sought contracts that average around seven years. These contracts generally use a 
trailing market index with some utilizing freight adjustments. 
The firm believed that the maturity of the market, technical capacity and price stability were 
the most important factors in determining whether to enter into a long-term supply contract. 
As for determining whether to maintain or terminate a long-term contract, the firm indicated 
that price stability, investment returns and environmental laws were the most important. The 
firm also indicated it was important to maintain community relations in their local business 
dealings as clients generally want to avoid potential public relation issues. Previous experience 
was also considered important as it is important to be able to trust the party you are contract 
with. Lastly, the firm indicated that while currently sustainable certifications are not considered 
important, they would be if there was a financial incentive to maintain them. 
In general, the firm worried about the immaturity of the bioenergy market in deciding whether 
to enter into a long-term supply contract. The firm cited uncertainty with environmental laws 
and how that could adversely affect their clients. The firm did believe, however, that long-term 
supply contracts can provide some benefits like price stability and insurance of market share 
in shallow markets. The firm believed these benefits would only allow for some limited use 
but not widespread adoption. 
 
Procurement Firm 
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 One wood procurement firm was interviewed in the study (Table 11). The 
procurement firm currently does not operate under a long-term supply agreement but has 
agreed, in principal, to a possible long-term supply contract with a renewable energy firm, 
pending a mill sale. However, the procurement firm has utilized a renewable one year contract 
with a pulp and paper company for over four decades and does procure fiber for several pellet 
mills in the southeast. 
 The firm gave a few reasons for not currently using any long-term supply contracts. 
First, renewable one year contracts have worked well for them so they see no need to change 
from what has worked for them in the past. Second, renewable energy firms have “unrealistic 
expectations with price stability” over the life of the contract; whereas they would like for the 
price to fluctuate depending on local demand. Lastly, the firm sighted a lack of interest for 
long-term contracts from traditional wood product firms as a reason for not currently utilizing 
them. 
 In determining whether to enter into, maintain, or terminate a long-term supply 
contract, the firm indicated fuel source availability was one of the major factors impacting their 
decision making. As other forestry companies have noted, if they cannot source the needed 
timber, they will default on their legal obligations under the contract. Community relations was 
the second most important aspect for the procurement firm as the firm mostly procures timber 
from NIPF landowners and if you have poor relations with them, it calls into question the 
reliability of the available fuel source. Lastly, the firm considered their experience with the 
other contracting party(ies) in whether to enter into, maintain, and/or terminate a long-term 
supply contract. The firm also stated that they will not enter into any contract whereby they 
supply 100% of the mill’s needs. The firm believes this sets you up for failure when unforeseen 
circumstances limit harvesting activities and the mill does not have the necessary supply to 
operate. Whereas, if multiple companies supply the mill, “you are not blamed” for supply 
issues. 
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Chapter 5 – Discussion 
Study participants’ were mixed on their reasons for using or not using long-term supply 
contracts but none of these participants procured any biomass via a long-term supply contract 
for energy generation. For many of the participants in this study, it simply got down to the fact 
they had a system they felt worked and saw no need to change what “wasn’t broken.” This 
was particularly true for the NIPF landowners in this study as well as some of the interviewed 
intermediate users and Biomass Power Plants. Generally speaking, however, this fact did not 
preclude these participants from stating they would potentially be open to the future use of a 
long-term contract. 
Loss of control was another important issue, particularly for NIPF landowners. For NIPF 
landowners, this issue took the form of both concern over harvesting when timber prices are 
low as well as possibly poor harvesting conditions and the opinions of relatives. Loss of control 
was one of the most widely cited issues for NIPF landowners in previous studies (Hickman 
and Gehlhausen 1981; McGill et al. 2008; Meyer and Klemperer 1984; Somberg 1971). 
Industrial Timberland Owners, Intermediate Users, and Utilities, on the other hand, believed 
long-term contracts could help them control the market by minimizing risk. This belief mirrors 
what von Hirschhausen and Neumann stated, long-term contracts can help parties in 
[immature] industries reduce the risk associated with relationship-specific investments (2008).  
Scale of operations was also an important factor for many of the participants. Several of the 
intermediate and end users indicated that they would only work with parties that controlled 
enough fiber to back a contract. While none of the participants explicitly indicated an acreage 
minimum, or maximum, it seems likely that previous acreage requirements of roughly 500-
1000 acres as found by Siegel (1973), would underestimate minimum requirements. Echoing 
these sentiments, one of the TIMOs mentioned this as an issue that has prohibited them from 
entering into a long-term contract. In addition, these intermediate and end users indicated the 
only parties that did control the necessary fiber required a premium over market; making these 
contracts financially undesirable, as Pellet Mill 1 stated during their interview. 
Price was also an important factor. For the NIPF landowners, they stated they desired to 
receive maximum income for their timber. These landowners expressed concern that if they 
did not have control over their timber, the counter-party to the contract might harvest their 
timber when prices are low. Industrial Timberland Owners were also concerned about the 
price received under a long-term contract due to their fiduciary duties. This led some of these 
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owners to require a premium over the prevailing market price when timber is harvested. These 
price premium requirements made long-term supply contracts financially undesirable to many 
intermediate and end users. 
Long-term offtake agreements also played a large role for several intermediate users in 
determining whether to use, or not use, long-term supply contracts. These intermediate users, 
generally, stated they would not build a new mill until these agreements were in place. While 
these mills were open to using long-term supply contracts for the fiber procurement needs, 
they have not been needed as they have guaranteed demand for their product and built mills 
in areas with less competition. Additionally, the price premium most landowners that control 
significant amounts of timberland place on any fiber sold through a long-term supply contract 
has made these less financially desirable. 
Considering these factors, do the components of a long-term supply contract discussed in the 
literature review change? Generally speaking, no. In many ways, results from this study mirror 
those studies previously discussed. However, this study revealed that none of the previous 
types of long-term contracts were considered highly desirable. That being said, results from 
this study suggest that while the contract type might not resemble those studied in the past, 
there are several components that are important to include in future contracts. 
This study further supports what was found in previous studies (Hickman and Gehlhausen 
1981; McGill et al. 2008) that NIPF landowners were very concerned with losing control over 
their land. Consequently, it would be prudent for any long-term contract, or lease, to include 
provisions to minimize or eliminate this concern. This could come in the form of a clause that 
would allow for renegotiations in the event of “gross inequities,” as suggested by Joskow 
(1988). NIPF landowners could also be given what would amount to a “right of first refusal” 
for certain silvcultural and harvesting activities. Limiting the length of the contract would also 
be prudent. This study supports what was found by Hickman and Gehlhausen (1981), as well 
as McGill et al. (2008), that NIPF landowners generally expect to hold their land for an 
extended period of time (all respondents stated they plan to hold their land for 20+ years) and 
possibly even pass it on to their heirs. According to the 2013 National Woodland Owner 
Survey, over half of the respondents received their land from a family member (Butler et al. 
2016). Thus, contract lengths of five to 10 years would seem most reasonable and would likely 
help assuage landowner concerns over losing control of their property for the whole time of 
ownership. Industrial Timberland owners that participated in this study also desired contracts 
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of this length as they did not exceed the length of fixed term commingled funds. An additional 
benefit to shorter contract lengths is that it should be less complicated to qualify for capital 
gains treatment. 
Another concern among NIPF landowners in this study, as well as those studied by Hickman 
and Gehlhausen (1981) and McGill et al. (2008), was the concern over harvest quality and the 
condition of the property after a harvest. “Performance bonds” were found to be popular 
among landowners in east Texas by Hickman and Gehlhausen (1981). Thus, it would be 
prudent to require some form of performance bond as insurance against poor harvest quality 
and land degradation. 
Given the importance of pricing to all participants, it would be prudent to use some form of 
a local market index to determine pricing and not use the Producer Price Index as it was found 
to underestimate market prices by Hotvedt and Tedder (1977). The question then becomes 
whether to use a rolling-average and/or charge a premium over market. Depending on how 
risk adverse a given party is, they should be more inclined to pay a premium over market in 
exchange for less risk. Several participants down the supply chain indicated that price 
premiums were not acceptable to them. However, these participants located their mills in areas 
with low levels of competition; allowing them to be pickier in their procurement choices than 
a mill located in deeper markets. 
Another important part of any long-term contract, or lease, is to include a robust force majeure 
clause. Given bioenergy’s dependence on European subsidies, a policy change in Europe could 
render U.S. pellet operations obsolete. Consequently, it is imperative that any party entering 
into a long-term contract should account for this possibilities, or at least be sure to link their 
contract to the potential renewal or cessation of the bioenergy policies in the European Union. 
There are many tax considerations that also need to be accounted for when deciding on using 
a long-term contract. As previously stated, there are two ways to qualify for capital gains 
treatment. A landowner can either (a) qualify for capital gains tax treatment through an outright 
sale of a capital asset (i.e. their timber) or (b) by making payment for the timber conditioned 
on when, and how much, is harvested (Ah Pah Redwood v. Commissioner, 1959; Lawton v. 
Commissioner, 1959; Dyal v. United States, 1965; Camp v. United States, 1974). Lastly, the 
ability to terminate the contract without the consent of the other party could create tax 
treatment complications related to income and expenses (Gaskin v. United States, 1966). 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
Due to the growing global population, corresponding demand for electricity, and concerns 
around climate change, it is important for the world to find ways to meet these increased 
demands through renewable sources of energy (Aguilar et al. 2011; ECON 2012; NYT 2011). 
One possible way to increase the amount of energy generated from renewable sources is to 
increase the use of woody biomass (Jiang et al. 2010). However, expanding the use of woody 
biomass as a renewable energy source has not been easy. 
For starters, many utilities, such as those in this study and other studies, do not find woody 
biomass to be economically feasible in most situations (Aguilar et al. 2011; Faaji 2008; Flamos 
et al. 2011; Jing et al. 2010). While some incentives have been put in place (Anderson 2012), 
depending on them as a business strategy is incredibly risky, as mentioned by both Biomass 
Power Plants in this study. Several scholars, as well as industry members, have indicated that 
one possible way to increase the utilization of woody biomass in power generation would be 
to increase the use of long-term supply contracts (Burchfield 2011; Doster 2011; Jiang et al. 
2010; von Hirschhausen and Neumann 2008; Yin and Izlar 2001).  
So why haven’t we seen more widespread use of these agreements for the woody biomass 
supply chain and is this likely to change? The answer is complicated. Due to the inefficiencies 
of using woody biomass, a geographically distributed resource, and the efficiencies of using 
fossil fuels, a geographically concentrated resource, bioenergy is not likely to gain significant 
market share without individuals and businesses being willing to pay more for their energy. 
Where biomass energy has expanded in use, it has usually been backed by subsidies. 
In the end, possibly the most important factor is how stakeholders view long-term contracts 
as a strategy. Buyers in this studied mentioned them being financial undesirable due to their 
higher costs associated with price premiums. Sellers, on the other hand, said they felt long-
term contracts would limit their ability to receive maximum value for their timber. Is it possible 
for them to be both? Well if the contract includes a rolling average pricing mechanism, it’s 
possible that at times it will be the highest priced/cost timber, and at other times the lowest 
priced/cost timber. It will however, never reach the market peaks or troughs that parties might 
experience in the spot market. Thus, if layered appropriately, it’s possible to keep your 
revenue/expenses relatively flat compared to participating in the spot market. This strategy is 
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utilized by many Utilities and allows them to focus on eliminating inefficiencies elsewhere in 
their business while guaranteeing a steady supply/price. Thus, if parties looked at long-term 
contracts as a way to minimize market risk, via lowering market swings, we could see an 
increased future use of long-term contracts in the bioenergy and forestry industries. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A – NIPF Landowners Survey 
 
Bioenergy Long-Term Contracts Questionnaire 
Individual Forest Landowners 
 
North Carolina State University 
Department of Forestry & Environmental Resources 
 
This interview is designed to learn more about your experience and interest with long 
term contracts for wood supply in the bioenergy sector.  This research will provide 
general information about bioenergy contracts, which could be useful for producers 
and consumers in the bioenergy market.  We have questions about your practices, 
potential strategies and specific factors that influence them.  You do not need to 
answer any questions that you feel would present a problem with proprietary business 
information. 
 
 
Questions about your forest property: 
1. Have you ever been contacted about selling your timber?  
   No (Proceed to Question 4)  Yes (Proceed to Question 2) 
 
2.      How were you contacted about selling your timber? 
  In Person 
  Mail 
  E-Mail 
  Phone 
  Other (Specify): _____________________ 
 
3.     Were you contacted about selling your timber for bioenergy uses? 
No  
Yes 
Don’t Know 
 
4. Have you ever had timber harvested from your property?  
             No (Proceed to Question 16)              Yes (Proceed to Question 5) 
 
5. How many acres were harvested?   _________ acres 
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6. What was approximate value of the harvested timber? (check one)   
 
Less than $20,000   $80,001-$100,000 
  $20,001-$40,000   $100,001-$150,000 
  $40,001-$60,000   $150,001-$200,000 
  $60,001-$80,000   More than $200,000 
   
7. Did you use a forester to help you make the sale?         No  Yes 
 
If yes, what type of forester? 
Private consultant 
Industry forester 
Other: ___________________ 
 
8. Who else was involved in the sale? 
Only me and the buyer 
Lawyer 
Family member—relation (e.g., father, sister, etc.):__________________ 
Other: _______________________ 
 
9. How satisfied were you with the revenue generated from the sale? 
Very satisfied 
Somewhat satisfied  
Somewhat dissatisfied  
Very dissatisfied   
 
10. Please describe why you were satisfied or dissatisfied with revenues generated from 
sale. 
________________________________________________________________________
______ 
 
 
11. How satisfied were you with the condition of your forest following the timber harvest? 
                     Very satisfied 
                     Somewhat satisfied  
                     Somewhat dissatisfied  
                     Very dissatisfied   
12. Please describe why you were satisfied or dissatisfied with the condition of your forest. 
________________________________________________________________________
______ 
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13.    What type of method did you use to sell your timber? 
          Sealed bid 
          Negotiated 
          Sold According to Long-Term Timber Contract/Lease 
          Don’t know 
 
 
14. What type of transaction method did you use?  
                     Lump sum sale (received full amount in a single payment prior to harvest) 
                     Pay as cut (timber buyer paid for each load taken to sawmill using set prices per 
                     unit for each species) 
                     Percentage (timber buyer paid a percentage they received at the mill) 
                     Other: _____________________________________ (type of transaction) 
 
15.       Following the harvest, was the area reforested? 
          Yes 
          No 
          Don’t Know 
 
16. How long have you owned your land? _________ years 
 
17. How long do you think you or your family will continue to hold onto the land? 
          1-9 years      
          10-19 years 
          20+ years 
 
 
Questions about long-term timber leases 
Generally, long-term timber leases feature two main parts: 
1) an agreed-upon annual or single up -front fee paid by a purchasing party to retain the 
right to harvest an agreed-upon amount of timber in a specified time period (generally 5 to 20 
years), and  
2) an agreed upon price for timber harvested during the lease period.  
The timing and harvesting guidelines for long-term leases can vary considerably and are set in 
place by the contract between the landowner and timber leasing party. 
 
18. Are you under a long-term timber lease currently? 
          No (Proceed to Question 21)            Yes (Proceed to Question 19) 
 
19.    Is the long-term timber lease for bioenergy uses? 
           No      Yes               Don’t know 
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20. Which of the following, if any, contract/lease types does your contract most accurately 
reflect? (check one) 
 
 Long-Term Supply Contract/Lease Type 
 1. One initial lump-sum payment that covers both land lease and timber 
purchase for term of contract 
 2. Specific timber cutting rights with payment on a volume basis as cut; No 
lease of land or timber;  Company has management responsibilities 
 3. Same as 2 but company has no management responsibilities 
 4. Increment contract: landowner receives regular (e.g, annual or quarterly) 
payment which is determined by the average annual growth the land can 
produce under management; Any harvested timber that exceeds the 
accumulated value of the regular payments is paid for on a volume basis 
 5. Lease of land with annual or periodic payments, plus initial lump-sum 
purchase of timber 
 6. Lease of land with annual or periodic payments, plus timber cutting rights 
with timber paid for on a volume basis as cut 
 7. Lease of both land and timber with annual or periodic payments: no 
additional payment when timber is cut 
 8. Share-crop contract: company manages the land and harvest timber: harvest 
value at current market stumpage prices is shared with landowner as agreed in 
contract 
 9. Other type(s)—please specify: 
Comments:  
 
 
21.    Would you be willing to enter into a long-term contract with a company that would pay 
          you an annual lease fee for a set period of time (say 10 years) plus the average fair 
          market value for timber when it is harvested? 
            No  Yes 
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22. Please read each factor carefully and rate their importance to you when considering 
whether or not to enter, maintain, or end a long-term timber contract or lease. (Circle the level of 
importance that applies: 1=not important; 2=slightly important; 3=Neutral; 4=important; 5=very 
important) 
 
Contract/Leasing 
Factor 
Not 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Important 
Very 
Important 
 
Knowing I have good 
information on timber 
values 
1 2 3 4 5 
Condition of roads 
during and after harvest 1 2 3 4 5 
Scenic beauty after 
harvest is finished 1 2 3 4 5 
Provision for improving 
or maintaining wildlife 
habitat 
1 2 3 4 5 
Prevention of soil 
erosion and protection 
of water quality 
1 2 3 4 5 
Control over when 
harvesting will occur 
(e.g. holidays, hunting 
season, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Control over what trees 
are harvested (species, 
sizes) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Receiving at least some 
annual income 
1 2 3 4 5 
Receiving income up-
front, rather than when 
timber is harvested 
1 2 3 4 5 
Receiving maximum 
income from your 
timber 
1 2 3 4 5 
Reducing the risk of 
timber price fluctuations 
in the future 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Improving the growth 
and quality of your 
timber 
1 2 3 4 5 
Concern over multiple 
harvests on your land 
over the term of the 
lease 
1 2 3 4 5 
Provision for early 
termination of the lease 
1 2 3 4 5 
Ability to obtain 
“green” certification for 
your timber 
1 2 3 4 5 
Other (specify below) 1 2 3 4 5 
23.    (a) Of the preceding factors, which 3 do you consider to be the most important in 
         determining whether to enter into a long-term supply contract (1 – Most Important, 2 – 
         2nd Most Important, 3rd Most Important)? 
1) ____________________ 
2) ____________________ 
3) ____________________ 
 
           (b) Please briefly explain why you consider these three factors to be the most 
                 important. 
  1) ____________________ 
  2) ____________________ 
   3) ____________________ 
 
24.    (a) Of the preceding factors, which 3 do you consider to be the most important in 
   determining whether to maintain or terminate a long-term supply contract (1 – Most 
   Important, 2 – 2nd Most Important, 3rd Most Important)? 
1) ____________________ 
2) ____________________ 
3) ____________________ 
 
          (b) Please briefly explain why you consider these three factors to be the most 
                important. 
  1) ____________________ 
  2) ____________________ 
   3) ____________________    
 
25. Would you be interested in finding out more about long-term timber leases? 
          No  Yes 
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26.    How much would you be willing to pay and how far would you be willing to travel to 
         attend a 2-hour workshop on long-term timber leases? 
 $_______ and ________miles  
 
27.    Would you be interested in finding out more about bioenergy? 
         No  Yes 
 
28.       How much would you be willing to pay and how far would you be willing to travel to 
attend a 2-hour workshop on bioenergy? 
 $_______ and ________miles  
 
 
Please answer the following questions about yourself: 
 
29. What is your gender?     Female   Male 
 
30. What year were you born?  19_____  
 
31. What is your occupation?   ____________________________ 
 
32. I live in:      ___________________county/_________________state 
 
33. I own a total of _____________ acres of land. With ____ in forest and ____ in 
agricultural land. 
 
34. Please indicate the type of timber on your property: 
  Hardwood 
  Softwood 
  Mixed (Mostly Hardwood, Some Softwood) 
  Mixed (Mostly Softwood, Some Hardwood) 
  Mixed (Even Amount of Hardwood and Softwood) 
 
35. Please indicate the age of the timber on your property: 
0-15 Years Old 
16-30 Years Old 
31+ Years Old 
 
36. What is your best source of information on timber markets?  
Short answer:________________________________________________________ 
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37. Are you satisfied with this source?      No     Yes 
  
 
 
 
38. What is the highest level of education you have completed? (Check only one) 
Some High School   Associates degree 
High School Graduate /GED  Bachelors degree 
Trade or Technical School  Masters degree 
Some college    Ph.D. 
  
 
39. What is your average yearly income? (Check only one) 
Less than 50,000 
$50,001 - $100,000 
$100,001 + 
 
40. Please use the space provided for additional questions/comments regarding long-term 
timber leases or this survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Why? 
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Appendix B – Industrial Landowners 
Bioenergy Long-Term Contracts Questionnaire 
Industrial Landowners 
 
North Carolina State University 
Department of Forestry & Environmental Resources 
 
 
This interview is designed to learn more about your experience and interest with long-term 
contracts for wood supply in the bioenergy sector.  This research will provide general 
information about bioenergy contracts, which could be useful for producers and consumers 
in the bioenergy market.  We have questions about your practices, potential strategies and 
specific factors that influence them.  You do not need to answer any questions that you feel 
would present a problem with proprietary business information.  
 
I. Introduction and Background 
1. Date: __________________________ 
 
2. Name of Company: ____________________________________ 
 
3. Location (City/State): ________________________________ 
 
4. How many acres of timberland does your company manage? 
 
Type North Carolina South Carolina Virginia 
Planted Pine    
Natural Pine    
Hardwoods    
 Total    
 
5. How many tons per year does your company harvest? 
 
Type North Carolina South Carolina Virginia 
Planted Pine    
Natural Pine    
Hardwoods    
Total    
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II. Long-Term Contract and Lease Requirements 
Note:  We are interested in learning more about your long-term contracts and leases.  The 
following set of questions apply to both, but if they differ, please indicate how.  
 
6. Does your company currently have any long-term (5 or more years) supply contracts? 
No: ___ (Proceed to Section III)   Yes: ___ (Proceed to Question 7) 
 
7. Does your company currently have any long-term (5 or more years) supply contracts with 
bioenergy producers-e.g. biofuels, biomass, wood pellets, etc? 
No: ___  Yes: ___ 
 
8. Over the last 5 years, approximately how many tons of each timber type has your company 
supplied through long-term supply contracts and/or leases? 
 
 
Timber Type (specify) 
Tons Supplied 
Minimum Maximum Average 
    
    
    
    
 
9. What length of period is used for long-term contracts and/or leases? 
 
 
Timber Type (specify) 
Contract/Lease Length (Years) 
Minimum Maximum Average 
    
    
    
    
 
10. For each type of timber, what is the minimum, maximum, and average number of acres, if 
any, for which your company requires for entering into a long-term supply contract? 
 
 
Timber Type (specify) 
Contract/Lease Acreage 
Minimum Maximum Average 
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11. Does your company use a price adjuster when entering into a long-term supply contracts 
and/or leases? 
No: ___ (Proceed to Question 13) Yes: ___ (Proceed to Question 12) 
 
12. Please describe the type(s) of price adjuster(s) your company uses: 
 
13. What other, if any, requirements does your company have for entering into long-term 
supply contracts and/or leases? 
 
14. Does your company have different requirements for long-term supply contracts for 
customers that do produce bioenergy? 
No: ___   Yes: ___ (Please Explain): 
 
15. What would your ideal contract look like-e.g., length, annual volume, price adjuster, etc.? 
 
16. Does your ideal contract change based on fuel source? (If Yes, Please Explain): 
 
17. Could we obtain a copy of your typical long-term supply contract? 
 
 
III. Types of Long-Term Supply Contracts and Leases 
18. Below is a list of commonly used types of long-term supply contracts and leases. Please 
indicate with a check mark in the space provided for the various types your company uses. 
(Proceed to Question 19 if your company currently does not utilize any long-term supply contracts or leases.) 
 
Bioenergy Traditional 
Long-Term Supply Contract/Lease Type # of 
Contract
s 
# of 
Acres 
# of 
Contracts # of 
Acres 
   
 
A. One initial lump-sum payment that covers both 
land lease and timber purchase for term of contract. 
   
 
B. Specific timber cutting rights with payment on a 
volume basis as cut. No lease of land or timber. 
Company has management responsibilities. 
   
 
C. Same as 2 but company has no management 
responsibilities. 
   
 
D. Increment contract: landowner receives regular 
(e.g, annual or quarterly) payment which is determined 
by the average annual growth the land can produce 
under management. Any harvested timber that 
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exceeds the accumulated value of the regular 
payments is paid for on a volume basis. 
   
 
E. Lease of land with annual or periodic payments, 
plus initial lump-sum purchase of timber. 
   
 
F. Lease of land with annual or periodic payments, 
plus timber cutting rights with timber paid for on a 
volume basis as cut. 
   
 
G. Lease of both land and timber with annual or 
periodic payments: no additional payment when 
timber is cut. 
   
 
H. Share-crop contract: company manages the land 
and harvest timber: harvest value at current market 
stumpage prices is shared with landowner as agreed in 
contract. 
    I. Other type(s)—please specify: 
Comments:   
 
19. (a) Based on the same list of commonly used types of long-term supply contracts and leases 
presented above,  which 3 types of long-term supply contracts/leases do you believe are 
the most promising in forestry in the future (1 – Most Promising, 2 – 2nd Most Promising, 3rd 
Most Promising)? 
1) _______________ 
2) _______________ 
3) _______________ 
 
(b) Please briefly describe why you believe these three types to be the most promising. 
 1) ______________________________________________________________. 
 2) ______________________________________________________________. 
 3) ______________________________________________________________. 
 
20. (a) Based on the same list of commonly used types of long-term supply contracts and leases 
presented above,  which 3 types of long-term supply contracts/leases do you believe are 
the most promising in bioenergy in the future (1 – Most Promising, 2 – 2nd Most Promising, 3rd 
Most Promising)? 
1) _______________ 
2) _______________ 
3) _______________ 
 
b) Please briefly describe why you believe these three types to be the most promising. 
 1) ______________________________________________________________. 
 2) ______________________________________________________________. 
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 3) ______________________________________________________________. 
 
  
IV. Reasons for Using/Not Using Long-Term Supply Contracts and Leases 
21. Please explain why your company currently does/does not use traditional long-term fiber 
supply contracts and/or leases: 
 
 
22. Please explain why your company currently does/does not use long-term supply contracts 
and/or leases with bioenergy producers: 
23. Please read each factor carefully and rate their importance to you when considering 
whether or not to enter, maintain, or end a long-term supply contract?  (Circle the level of 
importance that applies: 1=not important; 2=slightly important; 3=somewhat important; 4=important; 
5=extremely important) 
 
Factor 
Not 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important Important 
Extremely 
Important 
 
Maturity of Market 1 2 3 4 5 
Knowledge of Market 1 2 3 4 5 
Fuel Source Availability  1 2 3 4 5 
Price Stability 1 2 3 4 5 
Investment 
Returns/Risks 1 2 3 4 5 
Technical Capacity 1 2 3 4 5 
Environmental Laws 1 2 3 4 5 
Community Relations 1 2 3 4 5 
Incentives or Subsidies 1 2 3 4 5 
Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 
Ease of Doing Business 1 2 3 4 5 
Access to Credit 1 2 3 4 5 
Public Policy 1 2 3 4 5 
Sustainable 
Certifications 1 2 3 4 5 
Tax Rates 1 2 3 4 5 
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Complexity of Contracts 1 2 3 4 5 
Previous Experience 1 2 3 4 5 
Other (specify below) 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
24. (a) Of the preceding factors, which 3 do you consider to be the most important in 
determining whether to enter into a long-term supply contract or lease (1 – Most 
Important, 2 – 2nd Most Important, 3rd Most Important)? 
1) __________________ 
2) __________________ 
3) __________________ 
 
(b) Please briefly describe why the three factors you choose are the most important to you: 
  1) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  2) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  3) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
 
25. (a) Of the preceding factors, which 3 do you consider to be the most important in 
determining 
 whether to maintain or terminate a long-term supply contract before the contract end date 
 (1 – Most Important, 2 – 2nd Most Important, 3rd Most Important)? 
1) ____________________ 
2) ____________________ 
3) ____________________ 
 
(b) Please briefly explain why you consider these three factors to be the most important. 
  1) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  2) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  3) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
 
26. Do any of the rankings change in the previous two questions based on timber type (please 
explain)? 
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Appendix C – Intermediate Users 
Bioenergy Long-Term Contracts Questionnaire 
Pellet & Biofuel Producers 
 
North Carolina State University 
Department of Forestry & Environmental Resources 
 
 
This interview is designed to learn more about your experience and interest with long term 
contracts for wood supply in the bioenergy sector.  This research will provide general 
information about bioenergy contracts, which could be useful for producers and consumers 
in the bioenergy market.  We have questions about your practices, potential strategies and 
specific factors that influence them.  You do not need to answer any questions that you feel 
would present a problem with proprietary business information.  
 
I. Introduction and Background 
1. Date: __________________________ 
 
2. Name of Facility/Company: ____________________________________ 
 
3. Location (City/State): ________________________________ 
 
4. How many tons/gallons of pellets/biofuel does your company produce per year? 
 Quantity: __________________   Units: ___________________ 
 
5. Which of the following feedstocks does your company use and what are their shares?-e.g., 
corn, timber (residual or standing), switchgrass, etc.? 
 
Feedstock Type Share (%) 
Agricultural Residues  
Corn  
Timber Harvest Residues  
Standing Timber  
Switchgrass  
Urban Trees and Yard Waste  
Other (specify)  
 
6. Why has your company chosen the feedstock(s) that it has-e.g., profitability, proven 
technology, efficiency, public relations/perceptions etc.? 
 
84 
 
7. Looking 10 years into the future, how would your company like its feedstock supply to 
change, if at all? Why? 
 
8. (a) What three feedstock sources do you consider to be the most promising (1 – 1st most 
promising, 2 – 2nd most promising, 3 – 3rd most promising)? 
1) __________________ 
2) __________________ 
3) __________________ 
 
(b) Please briefly explain why you consider these feedstocks to be the most promising: 
  1) 
_____________________________________________________________. 
  2) 
_____________________________________________________________. 
  3) 
_____________________________________________________________. 
 
II. Long-Term Contract and Lease Requirements 
Note:  We are interested in learning more about your long-term contracts and leases.  The 
following set of questions applies to both, but if they differ, please indicate how.  
 
9. Does your company currently procure any feedstock through the use of long-term (5 or 
more years) supply contracts and/or leases? 
No: ___ (Proceed to Section III)   Yes: ___ (Proceed to Question 10) 
 
10. For each feedstock your company procures through long-term contracts, indicate the 
minimum, maximum, and average length used for long-term contracts and the percent 
procured of each fuel source in the last five years.  
  
 
Feedstock (specify) 
Contract/Lease Length (Years) Percent 
(%) 
procured 
through 
long-term 
supply 
contracts. 
Minimum Maximum Average 
Agricultural 
Residues 
    
Corn     
Timber Harvest 
Residues 
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Standing Timber     
Switchgrass     
Urban Trees and 
Yard Waste 
    
Other (specify)     
 
 
11. What quantity of each feedstock is procured through long-term contracts and/or leases? 
 
 
Feedstock (specify) 
Measurement 
Units (Specify) 
Quantity (Volume) 
Minimum Maximum Average 
     
     
     
     
 
12. For each type of feedstock, what is the minimum, maximum, and average number of acres, 
if any, for which your company requires for entering into a long-term supply contract 
and/or lease? 
 
 
Feedstock (specify) 
Contract/Lease Acreage 
Minimum Maximum Average 
    
    
    
    
 
13. Does your company use a price adjuster when entering into a long-term supply contract 
and/or leases? 
No: ___ (Proceed to Question 15) Yes: ___ (Proceed to Question 14) 
 
14. Please describe the type(s) of price adjuster(s) your company uses: 
 
15. What other, if any, requirements does your company have for entering into long-term 
supply contracts and/or leases? 
 
16. What would your ideal contract look like-e.g., length, percent procured of total, annual 
volume, price adjuster, etc.? 
 
17. Does your ideal contract change based on feedstock? (If Yes, Please Explain) 
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III. Types of Long-Term Supply Contracts and Leases 
18. Below is a list of commonly used types of long-term fiber supply contracts and leases. 
Please indicate the total number of contracts and the total number of acres under contract 
for each type used by the company. (Proceed to Question 19 of this section if your company currently 
does not utilize any long-term supply contracts or leases.)  {n.b., repeat this questions with extra 
sheets for each type of fuel source}. 
 
# of 
contracts 
# of Acres 
under contract Long-Term Fiber Supply Contract/Lease Type 
  
A. One initial lump-sum payment that covers both land lease and fiber  
purchase for term of contract. 
 
 
B. Specific fiber  harvest rights with payment on a volume basis as cut. No 
lease of land or fiber. Company has management responsibilities. 
  C. Same as B but company has no management responsibilities. 
 
 
D. Increment contract: landowner receives regular (e.g, annual or quarterly) 
payment which is determined by the average annual growth the land can 
produce under management. Any harvested fiber that exceeds the 
accumulated value of the regular payments is paid for on a volume basis. 
 
 
E. Lease of land with annual or periodic payments, plus initial lump-sum 
purchase of fiber. 
 
 
F. Lease of land with annual or periodic payments, plus fiber harvest rights 
with fiber paid for on a volume basis as cut. 
 
 
G. Lease of both land and fiber with annual or periodic payments: no 
additional payment when fiber is harvested. 
 
 
H. Share-crop contract: company manages the land and harvest fiber: harvest 
value at current market stumpage prices is shared with landowner as agreed 
in contract. 
  I. Other type(s)—please specify: 
Comments:  
 
19. (a) Based on the same list of commonly used types of long-term supply contracts and leases 
presented above, which 3 types of long-term supply contracts/leases listed below do you 
believe are the most promising in the future (1 – Most Promising, 2 – 2nd Most Promising, 
3rd Most Promising)? 
1) _____ 
2) _____ 
3) _____ 
 
(b) Please briefly explain why you consider the three types of contracts/leases to be the 
                 Most promising? 
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 1) 
_________________________________________________________________. 
 2) 
_________________________________________________________________. 
 3) 
_________________________________________________________________. 
 
20. Are you currently contracting with a wood dealer or other procurement company to obtain 
your feedstock? 
 
IV. Reasons for Using/Not Using Long-Term Supply Contracts and Leases 
 
21. Please explain why your company currently does/does not use long-term supply 
contracts/leases: 
 
22. Please read each factor carefully and rate their importance to you when considering 
whether or not to enter, maintain, or end a long-term supply contract/lease? (Circle the level 
of importance that applies: 1=not important; 2=slightly important; 3=somewhat important; 4= 
important; 5=extremely important)   
 
Factor 
Not 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important Important 
Extremely 
Important 
 
Maturity of Market 1 2 3 4 5 
Knowledge of 
Market 
1 2 3 4 5 
Fuel Source 
Availability 
1 2 3 4 5 
Price Stability 1 2 3 4 5 
Investment 
Returns/Risks 
1 2 3 4 5 
Technical Capacity 1 2 3 4 5 
Environmental 
Laws 
1 2 3 4 5 
Community 
Relations 
1 2 3 4 5 
Incentives or 
Subsidies 
1 2 3 4 5 
Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 
88 
 
Ease of Doing 
Business 
1 2 3 4 5 
Access to Credit 1 2 3 4 5 
Public Policy 1 2 3 4 5 
Sustainable 
Certifications 
1 2 3 4 5 
Tax Rates 1 2 3 4 5 
Complexity of 
Contracts 1 2 3 4 5 
Previous 
Experience 1 2 3 4 5 
Other (specify 
below) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
23. (a) Of the preceding factors, which 3 do you consider to be the most important in 
determining whether to enter into a long-term supply contract or lease (1 – Most 
Important, 2 – 2nd Most Important, 3rd Most Important)? 
1) ___________________ 
2) ___________________ 
3) ___________________ 
 
(b) Please briefly describe why the three factors you choose are the most important to you: 
  1) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  2) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  3) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
 
24. (a) Of the preceding factors, which 3 do you consider to be the most important in 
determining 
    whether to maintain or terminate a long-term supply contract/lease before the contract end 
    date (1 – Most Important, 2 – 2nd Most Important, 3rd Most Important)? 
1) ____________________ 
2) ____________________ 
3) ____________________ 
 
(b) Please briefly explain why you consider these three factors to be the most important. 
  1) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
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  2) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  3) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
 
25. Do any of these rankings change in the previous two questions based on feedstock type 
(please explain)? 
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Appendix D – Biomass CHP Facilities Questionnaire 
Bioenergy Long-Term Contracts Questionnaire 
Biomass CHP Facilities 
 
North Carolina State University 
Department of Forestry & Environmental Resources 
 
 
This interview is designed to learn more about your experience and interest with long-term 
contracts for wood supply in the bioenergy sector.  This research will provide general 
information about bioenergy contracts, which could be useful for producers and consumers 
in the bioenergy market.  We have questions about your practices, potential strategies and 
specific factors that influence them.  You do not need to answer any questions that you feel 
would present a problem with proprietary business information. 
 
 
I. Introduction and Background 
1. Date: __________________________ 
 
2. Name of Facility/Company: ____________________________________ 
 
3. Location (City/State): ________________________________ 
 
4. How much power does your company produce per year in North Carolina / Virginia / 
South Carolina (circle state)? 
Quantity: ______________   Units: _______ kilowatts or megawatts? 
 
5. Which of the following biomass feedstocks does your company use and what are their 
shares? 
 
Fuel Source Share (%) 
Agricultural Residues  
Municipal Solid Waste  
Timber Harvest Residues  
Standing Timber  
Switchgrass  
Urban Trees and Yard Waste  
Other (specify)  
      Total 100% 
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6. Why has your company chosen the feedstock(s) that it has-e.g., profitability, proven 
technology, efficiency, public relations/perceptions, RPS standard etc.? 
7. Looking 10 years into the future, how would your company like its feedstock supply to 
change, if at all? Why? 
 
8. (a) What three biomass feedstock sources do you consider to be the most promising (1 – 
1st most promising, 2 – 2nd most promising, 3 – 3rd most promising)? 
1) __________________ 
2) __________________ 
3) __________________ 
 
(b) Please briefly explain why you consider these feedstocks to be the most promising: 
  1) 
_____________________________________________________________. 
  2) 
_____________________________________________________________. 
  3) 
_____________________________________________________________. 
 
 
II. Long-Term Contracts 
Note:  We are interested in learning more about your long-term contracts and leases.  The 
following set of questions applies to both, but if they differ, please indicate how.  
 
9. Does your company currently procure any feedstock through the use of long-term (5 or 
more years) biomass supply contracts and/or leases? 
No: ___ (Proceed to Section III)   Yes: ___ (Proceed to Question 10) 
 
10. Please describe the type(s) of long-term supply contracts/leases used: 
 
 
11. For each biomass feedstock your company procures through long-term contracts, indicate 
the minimum, maximum, and average length used for long-term contracts/leases and the 
percent procured of each fuel source in the last five years.  
 
 
Feedstock (specify) 
Contract/Lease Length (Years) Percent 
(%) 
procured 
through 
long-term 
Minimum Maximum Average 
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supply 
contracts. 
Agricultural 
Residues 
    
Municipal Solid 
Waste 
    
Timber Harvest 
Residues 
    
Standing Timber     
Switchgrass     
Urban Trees and 
Yard Waste 
    
Other (specify)     
 
12. For each type of biomass feedstock, what is the minimum, maximum, and average quantity, 
if any, for which your company requires for entering into a long-term supply contract 
and/or lease? 
 
 
Fuel Source 
(specify) 
Measurement 
Units (Specify) 
Quantity (Volume) 
Minimum Maximum Average 
     
     
     
     
 
13. For each type of biomass feedstock, what is the minimum, maximum, and average number 
of acres, if any, for which your company requires for entering into a long-term supply 
contract and/or lease? 
 
 
Feedstock (specify) 
Contract/Lease Acreage 
Minimum Maximum Average 
    
    
    
    
 
14. Does your company use a price adjuster when entering into a long-term supply contract? 
No: ___ (Proceed to Question 16) Yes: ___ (Proceed to Question 15) 
 
15. Please describe the type(s) of price adjuster your company uses: 
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16. What other, if any, requirements does your company have for entering into long-term 
supply contracts and/or leases? 
 
17. What would your ideal contract look like-e.g., length, percent procured of total, annual 
volume, price adjuster, etc.? 
 
18. Does your ideal contract change based on fuel source? (If Yes, Please Explain) 
 
19. Are you currently contracting with a wood dealer or other procurement company to obtain 
your feedstock? Why? 
 
20. Could we obtain a copy of your typical long-term supply contract? 
 
 
 
III Reasons for Using/Not Using Long-Term Supply Contracts and Leases 
21. Please explain why your company currently does/does not use long-term supply 
contracts/leases: 
 
22. Based on your past experiences and future expectations, what type(s) of long-term supply 
contract(s) do you consider to be the most promising? 
 
23. Please read each factor carefully and rate their importance to you when considering 
whether or not to enter, maintain, or end a long-term supply contract/lease? (Circle the level 
of importance that applies: 1=not important; 2=slightly important; 3=somewhat important; 4= 
important; 5=extremely important) 
 
Factor 
Not 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Important Extremely 
Important 
 
Maturity of Market 1 2 3 4 5 
Knowledge of 
Market 
1 2 3 4 5 
Fuel Source 
Availability 
1 2 3 4 5 
Price Stability 1 2 3 4 5 
Investment 
Returns/Risks 1 2 3 4 5 
Technical Capacity 1 2 3 4 5 
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Environmental 
Laws 
1 2 3 4 5 
Community 
Relations 
1 2 3 4 5 
Incentives or 
Subsidies 
1 2 3 4 5 
Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 
Ease of Doing 
Business 
1 2 3 4 5 
Access to Credit 1 2 3 4 5 
Public Policy 1 2 3 4 5 
Sustainable 
Certifications 
1 2 3 4 5 
Tax Rates 1 2 3 4 5 
Complexity of 
Contracts 1 2 3 4 5 
Previous Experience 1 2 3 4 5 
Other (specify 
below) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
24. (a) Of the preceding factors, which 3 do you consider to be the most important in 
determining whether to enter into a long-term supply contract/lease (1 – Most Important, 
2 – 2nd Most Important, 3rd Most Important)? 
1) ____________________ 
2) ____________________ 
3) ____________________ 
 
(b) Please briefly explain why you consider these three factors to be the most important. 
  1) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  2) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  3) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
 
25. (a) Of the preceding factors, which 3 do you consider to be the most important in 
determining 
    whether to maintain or terminate a long-term supply contract/lease before the contract end 
    date (1 – Most Important, 2 – 2nd Most Important, 3rd Most Important)? 
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1) ____________________ 
2) ____________________ 
3) ____________________ 
 
26. Please briefly explain why you consider these three factors to be the most important. 
  1) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  2) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  3) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
 
27. Do any of the rankings change in the previous two questions based on feedstock type 
(please explain)? 
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Appendix E – Electric Utilities Questionnaire 
 
Bioenergy Long-Term Contracts Questionnaire 
Electric Utility Companies 
 
North Carolina State University 
Department of Forestry & Environmental Resources 
 
 
This interview is designed to learn more about your experience and interest with long-term 
contracts for wood supply in the bioenergy sector.  This research will provide general 
information about bioenergy contracts, which could be useful for producers and consumers 
in the bioenergy market.  We have questions about your practices, potential strategies and 
specific factors that influence them.  You do not need to answer any questions that you feel 
would present a problem with proprietary business information. 
 
 
I. Introduction and Background 
1. Date: __________________________ 
 
2. Name of Facility/Company: ____________________________________ 
 
3. Location (City/State): ________________________________ 
 
4. How much power does your company produce per year in North Carolina? 
Quantity: ______________   Units: _______ kilowatts or megawatts? 
  
5. What power sources make up your energy portfolio and what are their shares? 
 
Fuel Source Share (%) 
Biomass  
Coal  
Natural Gas  
Nuclear  
Solar  
Wind  
Wood pellets  
Other (specify)  
 
6. What reason(s) has your company chosen the energy portfolio that it has-e.g., profitability, 
public relations/perceptions, proven technology, efficiency, etc.? 
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7. (a) What three sources of energy (renewable and non-renewable) do you consider to be 
most promising (1 – Most promising, 2 – Second most promising, 3 – Third Most 
promising)? 
1) ____________________ 
2) ____________________ 
3) ____________________ 
 
(b) Please briefly explain why you consider these three sources to be the most promising. 
 1) ___________________________________________________________ 
 2) ___________________________________________________________ 
 3) ___________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Looking 10 years into the future, what percentage of your energy portfolio would you like 
renewable energy sources to make? Why? 
 
9. (a) What three sources of renewable energy do you consider to be the most promising (1 
– First, 2 – Second, 3 – Third)? 
1) ____________________ 
2) ____________________ 
3) ____________________ 
 
(b) Please briefly explain why you believe these three sources to be the most promising. 
 1) _______________________________________________________________ 
 2) _______________________________________________________________ 
 3) _______________________________________________________________ 
 
II. Long-Term Contracts 
10. Does your company currently procure any fuel sources through the use of long-term (5 or 
more years) supply contracts? 
No: ___ (Proceed to Section III)   Yes: ___ (Proceed to Question 11) 
 
11. Please describe the type(s) of long-term supply contracts used: 
 
12. For each fuel source your company procures through long-term contracts, indicate the 
minimum, maximum, and average length used for long-term contracts and the percent 
procured of each fuel source in the last five years.  
 
 
Fuel Source 
(specify) 
Contract Length (Years) Percent (%) procured 
through long-term 
contracts in past 5 years. Minimum Maximum Average 
Current 
Length 
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13. What quantity of woody biomass is procured through long-term contracts? 
 
 
Fuel Source 
(specify) 
Measurement 
Units (Specify) 
Quantity (Volume) 
Minimum Maximum Average 
     
     
     
     
 
14. What quantities of other fuel sources are procured through long-term contracts? 
 
 
Fuel Source 
(specify) 
Measurement 
Units (Specify) 
Quantity (Volume: Specify) 
Minimum Maximum Average 
Coal     
Natural Gas     
Nuclear     
Other:     
 
15. Does your company use a price adjuster when entering into a long-term supply contract 
for wood fiber, or for other fuel sources? 
No: ___ (Proceed to Question 17) Yes: ___ (Proceed to Question 16) 
 
16. Please describe the type(s) of price adjuster your company uses per fuel source below: 
 
17. What other, if any, requirements does your company have for long-term supply contracts 
it enters into? 
 
18. What would your ideal contract look like-e.g., length, percent procured of total, annual 
volume, price adjuster, etc.? 
 
19. Does your ideal contract change based on fuel source? (If Yes, Please Explain) 
 
20. Could we obtain a copy of your typical long-term supply contract? 
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III Reasons for Using/Not Using Contracts 
21. Why does/doesn’t your company currently use long-term wood fiber or other fuel supply 
contracts: 
 
22. Based on your past experiences and future expectations, what type(s) of long-term supply 
contract(s) do you consider to be the most promising? 
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23. Please read each factor carefully and rate their importance to you when considering 
whether or not to enter, maintain, or end a long-term supply contract? (Circle the level of 
importance that applies: 1=not important; 2=slightly important; 3=somewhat important; 4= important; 
5=extremely important) 
 
Factor 
Not 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
 
Maturity of Market 1 2 3 4 5 
Knowledge of 
Market 
1 2 3 4 5 
Fuel Source 
Availability 1 2 3 4 5 
Price Stability 1 2 3 4 5 
Investment 
Returns/Risks 
1 2 3 4 5 
Technical Capacity 1 2 4 4 5 
Environmental 
Laws 
1 2 3 4 5 
Community 
Relations 
1 2 3 4 5 
Incentives or 
Subsidies 
1 2 3 4 5 
Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 
Ease of Doing 
Business 
1 2 3 4 5 
Access to Credit 1 2 3 4 5 
Public Policy 1 2 3 4 5 
Sustainable 
Certifications 
1 2 3 4 5 
Tax Rates 1 2 3 4 5 
Complexity of 
Contracts 
1 2 3 4 5 
Previous Experience 1 2 3 4 5 
Other (specify 
below) 
1 2 3 4 5 
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24. (a) Of the preceding factors, which 3 do you consider to be the most important in 
determining whether to enter into a long-term supply contract (1 – Most Important, 2 – 
2nd Most Important, 3rd Most Important)? 
1) ____________________ 
2) ____________________ 
3) ____________________ 
 
(b) Please briefly explain why you consider these three factors to be the most important. 
  1) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  2) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  3) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
 
25. (a) Of the preceding factors, which 3 do you consider to be the most important in 
determining 
    whether to maintain or terminate a long-term supply contract before the contract end date 
(1 
    – Most Important, 2 – 2nd Most Important, 3rd Most Important)? 
1) ____________________ 
2) ____________________ 
3) ____________________ 
 
(b) Please briefly explain why you consider these three factors to be the most important. 
  1) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  2) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  3) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
 
26. Do any of the rankings change in the previous two questions based on fuel source (please 
explain)? 
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Appendix F – Procurement Firm Questionnaire 
 
Bioenergy Long-Term Contracts Questionnaire 
Procurement Firms 
 
North Carolina State University 
Department of Forestry & Environmental Resources 
 
 
This interview is designed to learn more about your experience and interest with long term 
contracts for wood supply in the bioenergy sector.  This research will provide general 
information about bioenergy contracts, which could be useful for producers and consumers 
in the bioenergy market.  We have questions about your practices, potential strategies and 
specific factors that influence them.  You do not need to answer any questions that you feel 
would present a problem with proprietary business information.  
 
I. Introduction and Background 
1. Date: __________________________ 
 
2. Name of Facility/Company: ____________________________________ 
 
3. Location (City/State): ________________________________ 
 
4. Can you briefly explain what _____________ does? 
 
5. How many tons does your company procure/supply per year in North Carolina / Virginia 
/ South Carolina / companywide (circle state)? 
 
6. Has your company been contracted by bioenergy producers (pellet mills, biofuels, CHP 
facilities, etc.) to procure their feedstock(s) for them? 
No: __ (Proceed to Section II)  Yes: __ (Proceed to Question 7) 
 
7. What type(s) of bioenergy producers have contacted you? 
 
8. Are you currently procuring any feedstock(s) for them? (If Yes, What Types. If No, Why Not) 
 
II. Long-Term Contract 
Note:  We are interested in learning more about your long-term contracts and leases.  The 
following set of questions applies to both, but if they differ, please indicate how.  
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9. Does your company currently procure any feedstock through the use of long-term 
contracts (5 or more years)? 
No: ___ (Proceed to Question 11)   Yes: ___ (Proceed to Question 10) 
10. Please describe the type(s) of long-term contracts used: 
 
11. Does your company currently supply any feedstock through the use of long-term (5 or more 
years) supply contracts? 
No: __ (Proceed to Section III)  Yes: __ (Proceed to Question 12) 
 
12. Please describe the type(s) of long-term contracts used: 
 
13. Are any of these long-term contracts with bioenergy producers (pellet mills, biofuels, CHP 
facilities, etc.)? 
No: __ (Proceed to Question 15)  Yes: __ (Proceed to Question 14) 
 
 
14. Please describe the type(s) of long-term contracts used: 
 
15. What are the required minimum and maximum lengths as well as the average length used 
for long-term contracts? 
 
 
Fuel Source (specify) 
Length 
Minimum Maximum Average 
    
    
    
    
 
16. What is the minimum, maximum, and average quantity, if any, for which your company 
requires for entering into a long-term contract? 
 
 
Feedstock (specify) 
Measurement 
Units (Specify) 
Quantity (Volume) 
Minimum Maximum Average 
     
     
     
     
 
17. Does your company use a price adjuster when entering into a long-term supply contract? 
No: ___ (Proceed to Question 19) Yes: ___ (Proceed to Question 18) 
 
104 
 
18. Please describe the type(s) of price adjuster(s) your company uses: 
 
19. What other, if any, requirements does your company have for entering into long-term 
supply contracts? 
 
20. What would your ideal contract look like-e.g., length, annual volume, price adjuster, etc.? 
21. Does your ideal contract change based on feedstock type or by supplied party type? (If Yes, 
Please Explain) 
 
22. Could we obtain a copy of your typical long-term supply contract? 
 
 
III. Reasons for Using/Not Using Long-Term Supply Contracts and Leases 
23. Please explain why your company currently does/does not use long-term supply 
contracts/leases: 
 
24. Please read each factor carefully and rate their importance to you when considering 
whether or not to enter, maintain, or end a long-term supply contract? (Circle the level of 
importance that applies: 1=not important; 2=slightly important; 3=somewhat important; 4= important; 
5=extremely important)   
 
Factor 
Not 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
 
Maturity of Market 1 2 3 4 5 
Knowledge of 
Market 
1 2 3 4 5 
Fuel Source 
Availability 
1 2 3 4 5 
Price Stability 1 2 3 4 5 
Investment 
Returns/Risks 1 2 3 4 5 
Technical Capacity 1 2 3 4 5 
Environmental 
Laws 1 2 3 4 5 
Community 
Relations 1 2 3 4 5 
Incentives or 
Subsidies 1 2 3 4 5 
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Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5 
Ease of Doing 
Business 
1 2 3 4 5 
Access to Credit 1 2 3 4 5 
Public Policy 1 2 3 4 5 
Sustainable 
Certifications 
1 2 3 4 5 
Tax Rates 1 2 3 4 5 
Complexity of 
Contracts 
1 2 3 4 5 
Previous 
Experience 1 2 3 4 5 
Other (specify 
below) 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
25. (a) Of the preceding factors, which 3 do you consider to be the most important in 
determining whether to enter into a long-term supply contract or lease (1 – Most 
Important, 2 – 2nd Most Important, 3rd Most Important)? 
1) ___________________ 
2) ___________________ 
3) ___________________ 
 
(b) Please briefly describe why the three factors you choose are the most important to you: 
  1) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  2) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  3) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
 
26. (a) Of the preceding factors, which 3 do you consider to be the most important in 
determining 
    whether to maintain or terminate a long-term supply contract/lease before the contract end 
    date (1 – Most Important, 2 – 2nd Most Important, 3rd Most Important)? 
1) ____________________ 
2) ____________________ 
3) ____________________ 
 
(b) Please briefly explain why you consider these three factors to be the most important. 
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  1) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  2) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
  3) 
__________________________________________________________________. 
 
27. Do any of these rankings change in the previous two questions based on feedstock type 
(please explain)? 
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